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This report examines the characteristics of historical data for vehicle fires in New 
Zealand parking buildings from 1995 to 2003, evaluates the probabilities of such fires 
using event tree analysis, and presents a cost-benefit analysis model for the provision 
of sprinklers in parking buildings. The historical data are filtered from New Zealand 
Fire Service FIRS data and provide the relevant probabilities for the event tree model 
which considers the type of parking buildings and different vehicle fire spread 
scenarios. The results from event tree model are applied into cost-benefit analysis 
model, where the cost-benefit ratio measure is used and annual cost avoidance of 
vehicle fire damage by sprinklers in the parking building is identified as the benefit. A 
case study is finally performed for a public parking building with a total floor area of 
30,000 m2 using Monte-Carlo simulation in the @RISK programme. 
 
It is found that on average, there were 12 vehicle fire incidents each year in New 
Zealand parking buildings. Multiple vehicle fire incidents accounted for 
approximately 3% of such fires. Deliberately lit is found to be the leading cause of 
vehicle fires in New Zealand parking buildings (26.7% of all fires). It is concluded 
that annual vehicle fire frequencies in New Zealand parking buildings are generally 
lower than those in buildings of other occupancies, and an economically automatic 
sprinkler system does not justify itself in a parking building situation from the 
building owner’s point of view, based on available data collected during this research. 
This appears to conform to the requirements for sprinklers placed by the acceptable 
solution in New Zealand Building Code. Annual usage ratio is found to be the most 
critical factor in determining the cost-benefit ratio, according to the sensitivity 
analysis in the case study. 
 
When an automatic sprinkler system is not provided in a closed parking building, it is 
recommended to have an effective smoke control system to provide tenable conditions 
for occupants and fire-fighters in the event of a fire; this is also mandatory in the 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Initiative for Research 
 
There are thousands of vehicle fires occurring each year in New Zealand. These fires 
cause the loss of property and pose a hazard to life safety. The combustible materials 
in a vehicle can include fuel, vehicle upholstery, insulating materials and plastic or 
trim. The ignition sources in a vehicle may stem from electrical malfunction, sparks 
generated from engine ignition or friction, hot exhaust components, overheating of 
mechanical components, engine backfire, careless use of smoking materials and 
deliberate behaviour. 
 
There has recently been some interest and discussion about vehicle fires, particularly 
those fires in parking buildings, emanating from the international fire safety 
engineering community within the news groups on the internet (M. Spearpoint, pers. 
Comm.). The main points of these discussions can be summarised as follows: 
 
• What is the likelihood of vehicle fires in parking buildings, and does the 
likelihood vary with the type of parking building (eg. private or public)? 
• How likely does the fire spread to neighbouring vehicles, and why? 
• What are the causes of vehicle fires in parking buildings (eg. arson, ignition, 
etc.)? 
• What materials are involved in vehicle fires in parking buildings? 
• What is the severity of the vehicle fires in parking buildings? 
• How appropriate is the installation of sprinklers in parking buildings to protect 
the life safety and/or property? 
 
When assessing fire safety in a parking building, one would first determine the likely 
frequency of vehicle fires in such buildings. This is also the subject normally brought 
up first in the vehicle fire discussions. This depends on a number of factors which 
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may include the type of building, and vehicle occupancy during a certain time period 
etc. The likely frequency of fire in a business car park where vehicles remain for the 
whole day should be lower than a public facility where vehicle occupancy may be 
alternating with greater frequency. 
 
The spread of fire between vehicles in a parking building is another topic receiving 
attention. The radiation effect of fire from the vehicle ignited first is generally 
considered as the major cause of fire spread; it can cause the ignition of combustible 
materials on adjacent vehicles such as tyres, windows joint, etc. The fire spread 
between parked vehicles is dependant on the geometry of the building. In a closed 
parking building, the compartment effect of burning can increase the likelihood of fire 
spread. If the fire occurs in a vehicle parked in a parking building open to air, the 
direction and velocity of wind can influence the fire development significantly. 
Although there is always the potential of fire spread between parked vehicles for any 
ventilation condition, the quick intervention of fire-fighters or the operation of 
sprinklers can prevent this from happening. 
 
The severity of vehicle fires is also a subject of interest, fundamental to fire 
engineering design for life safety and property protection in parking buildings. 
Vehicle fire severity involves heat release rate and toxic product concentrations 
generated by burning vehicles. 
 
The provision of a sprinkler system in a parking building is a topic also attracting 
specific discussion. There are two groups of thought. One considers the frequency of 
the fire as low and/or cast doubt on the effect of the sprinklers controlling the fire 
spread. The other proposes that the sprinklers can control the fire development, 
providing a tenable condition for the building occupants and fire-fighters, and giving 
protection for the property. 
 
This report attempts to answer these questions as best as possible using appropriate 
literature and put these in a New Zealand perspective using relevant New Zealand 
data. Before the objectives of this research are presented, the introductions are given 
for the following: parking building definition, case studies of vehicle fires in parking 
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buildings, active fire protection systems in parking buildings, and code requirements 
of fire safety in parking buildings. 
 
1.2 Parking Buildings 
 
Parking buildings are generally used for the parking of motor vehicles, and do not 
include private garages and vehicle repairers etc. A parking building can be either 
private or public type. The private type is generally for people specifically entitled to 
park there, whereas the public type is for the use of any member of the public. The 
parking building can be either single level or multi-storied structure, as a standalone 
building or a structure adjacent to or above/below other occupancy. The structure of a 
parking building can also be classified to open and closed type, according to the 
ventilation condition. Building codes usually give the definition of openness of a 
parking building. Steel and concrete are the most commonly used materials for the 
parking building construction. The fire safety requirements, including structure fire 
ratings and provision of fire protection system such as sprinklers, vary between 
different building codes. 
 
For a parking building, the average floor area per one parking space in this building is 
defined as the Efficiency (Chrest et al., 2000). As of 2000, the goal of most parking 
building designs in the US was to achieve an Efficiency of 28 to 30 m2/space (300 to 
325 ft2/space). The number of parking spaces in a parking building can therefore be 
expressed by dividing the total floor area by Efficiency. An Efficiency value of 
29m2/space was used for analysis of the parking building in this research. 
 
1.3 Historical Case Studies 
 
Six case studies of vehicle fires in car parks, three in Europe and three in Australia, 
are introduced in this section. All these vehicle fire incidents, except for the one in the 
UK, occurred in enclosed car park buildings. Two incidents occurred in public type 
parking buildings, one in a Swedish underground car park and another in a UK multi-
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storey car park. The other four incidents occurred in what appear to be private car 
parks. 
 
A fire incident in a multi-storey car park in Preston (Lancashire, UK) caused damage 
to 100 m2 of concrete structure (Anon, 1991). Three cars received severe damage and 
six other cars suffered heat and smoke damage. This fire started in the engine 
compartment of a parked car. The fire was finally extinguished by fire-fighters, who 
had to wear breathing apparatus due to the smoke accumulation at the low level above 
the floor. 
 
More than 100 cars were destroyed in an underground car park in Sweden in 1992 
(Arvidson et al., 1997). The rapid flame progress across the ceiling was reported to 
have caused the fire spread between the cars. 
 
Another underground car park fire in Austria in 1996 (Arvidson et al., 1997) caused 
the loss of 14 cars and severe structural damage. The fire-fighters initially could not 
reach the seat of the fire due to the intense heat and zero visibility. Seventeen 
occupants in the residential flats above the car park suffered smoke inhalation and 
were given medical treatment. 
 
Lambert (1999) reported a similar fire incident in a basement car park measuring  
15 m by 30 m, under residential units in New South Wales, Australia. There were five 
cars in the basement; fire destroyed three cars and damaged two others before it was 
brought under control by fire-fighters. Large volumes of smoke and zero visibility 
were reported. Severe structural damage, including concrete spalling and the 
dislodging of concrete slabs, was caused by the intense heat produced by this 
basement vehicle fire. 
 
Pentony and Manser (2002) reported a fire incident also in New South Wales, 
Australia, which happened in an open deck car park measuring 50 m by 20 m, under 
three levels of apartments. The car park was also divided by steel wire mesh into 38 
separate garages. The fire started in a garage on the south side and progressed to 
seven other garages, causing damage to cars, stock and structural components. The 
opposite residential units, at a distance of 3.2 m from this building, also received 
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damage caused by radiant heat. The article recommended the installation of a 
sprinkler system in the parking building. The authors also concluded that the fire can 
spread between parked vehicles in an open car park and that the belief that fire 
contained only within single vehicles in an open car park, should be revised. Garrad 
(2002) stated that sufficient ventilation and the control of material combustibility are 
critical for fire safety in the design of parking buildings as demonstrated by this fire, 
although it does not justify the provision of sprinklers. 
 
A recent fire, reported by James (2003), occurred in a car park within a non-
sprinklered building in Australia. The building contained an enclosed car park 
accommodating 11 vehicles, a laundrette on the ground floor and six two-storey 
residential townhouses above. The fire was caused by the self-heating of cotton hand 
towels stored in the car park, and then spread to an adjacent car with ultimately three 
vehicles becoming involved in the fire. A smoke alarm was activated in one of the 
units above the car park. This fire resulted in $75,000 (Australian dollars) worth of 
property damage and $100,000 worth of vehicle damage. It was reported that fire-
fighters experienced great difficulty in locating and extinguishing the fire due to the 
poor visibility. The report finally recommended upgrading of the vehicle exhaust 
ventilation system in the car park, the installation of appropriate passive fire 
protection at duct work penetrations, and the maintenance of existing smoke alarms in 
the building. 
 
The case studies presented above highlighted the extent of hazard by vehicle fires in 
parking buildings to both human life safety and property protection. In particular, that 
smoke generated by the burning vehicles poses a great danger to life safety. The 
following photos in Figure 1-1 visually demonstrate the severity of burning and the 






Figure 1-1: Car fire photos (Photo by Wayne Tomblinson www.amazingfirephotos.com) 
 




For the purpose of reducing life and property loss in the event of a fire, fire risk 
management is necessary and generally involves three main phases according to the 
time sequence (Ramachandran, 1998): 
 
• Before the fire – fire prevention 
• During the fire – appropriate actions to provide occupants with essential 
assistance to reach a place of safety 
• After the fire – salvage operations, repairs to building damage and resumption 
of activities interrupted by the fire incident 
 
The appropriateness of the provision of an active fire protection system for a parking 
building is assessed and determined in the first stage of fire risk management, which 
is fire prevention. 
 
Fire prevention generally first involves identification of ignition sources and 
combustible materials. The next step in this phase would include the fire risk 
assessment carried out either qualitatively or quantitatively. If the fire loss is assessed 
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to reach an unacceptable level, the reduction or possible elimination of the ignition 
sources is considered. Alternatively, fire prevention measures can be adopted to assist 
the occupants to safely evacuate the building and reduce the extent of fire damage to 
property in the event of a fire. 
 
For a parking building, vehicles parked within are the main ignition sources and 
combustible objects. Unlike fixed objects in the building structure, the number of 
vehicles coming into the parking building is a constantly changing variable. Therefore 
the provision of fire prevention measures is more suitable to provide the protection 
required for both human life and property for this situation. 
 
These fire prevention measures consist of both passive and active control. Passive fire 
control is generally built into the structure of the building such as fire rated partitions 
and protected steel work etc., whereas active control is achieved by actions taken by 
human or automatic devices. The active fire control measures usually include 
automatic sprinklers, automatic smoke detectors and alarms, smoke control systems 
and manual fire fighting devices. Automatic sprinkler and smoke control systems are 
the commonly adopted active fire protection measures for parking buildings. 
 
Water is the most common agent used in automatic sprinkler systems, mainly because 
it is readily available, economical and non-toxic to humans. Though not necessarily 
extinguishing the fire, the operation of sprinklers can at least cool the environment, 
control the fire and protect the building until the fire can be suppressed by other 
means. 
 
Sprinklers can decrease the fire risk to property and life by reducing property damage, 
and controlling fire spread extent and the probability of flashover. Therefore for a 
sprinkler protected building, some codes allow the reduction in fire resistance rating, 
an increase in building and compartment size, and an increase in evacuation time or 
escape route length. 
 
In a building with both sprinklers and smoke control systems installed, there might be 
some interaction between the two systems. In the event of a fire, the water sprayed by 
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the activated sprinklers tends to reduce the buoyancy of the combustion product and 
counter the outward flow through the vent. 
 
1.4.2 Views from Literature 
 
Described in this section are references from historical literature expressing opinion 
on active fire protection systems in parking buildings, especially the underground car 
park. These arguments are mainly about the suitability of providing automatic 
sprinkler and smoke control systems in parking buildings to achieve the protection of 
both life and property. 
 
Parnell (1985) stated that a mechanical extraction system, instead of the natural 
venting method, should be adopted for smoke control design for an underground car 
park. 
 
Turner (1986) discussed the importance of sprinkler systems installed in the 
underground car park in terms of the life safety of the fire-fighter and occupants. The 
author argued that in the event of a vehicle fire, the mechanical ventilation system 
could supply the fresh air and result in a faster growing and more severe fire. 
Operation of the sprinkler system would reduce the air temperature and also prevent 
the fire spreading between parked vehicles. 
 
Stead (2000) also discussed fire brigade’s insistence of sprinkler provision in an 
underground car park as part of a development in Portsmouth, UK. It was argued that 
there is a rather high likelihood of fire spreading between closely parked vehicles, 
especially in a confined space and the smoke control system might not even be able to 
extract the smoke produced by a single burning vehicle. 
 
Horton (2000) stated that the provision of compartmentation and sprinklers in the car 
park do not necessary guarantee a safe fire-fighter access. In this article, the use of an 
addressable automatic fire detection system with an auto-dialler function was 




1.4.3 Code Requirements 
 
1.4.3.1 Acceptable Solution C/AS1 – New Zealand 
 
In New Zealand, the mandatory provisions for building work are contained in the New 
Zealand Building Code (NZBC); the relevant clauses for fire safety in buildings are 
C1, C2, C3 and C4. In particular, the requirements for fire safety in car parks are laid 
out in clauses 6.10.3 to 6.10.6, in Part 6 (Control of Internal Fire and Smoke Spread) 
of Acceptable Solution C/AS1 (New Zealand Building Industry Authority and 
Standards Association of New Zealand, 2000). 
 
The spaces for car parking within a building are required to be separate firecells, 
which have to be constructed with fire rated floors and supporting structures. 
 
If a car park firecell is not protected by sprinklers and smoke control in car park is not 
by natural cross-ventilation, the following requirements are to be met: 
 
• Entry to any safe path or protected shaft has to be preceded by a protected path 
• Specific fire engineering design is required for smoke control measures 
• A type 3 alarm system has to be installed for a car park having more than 10 
parking spaces. Type 3 alarm refers to automatic fire alarm system activated 
by heat detectors and manual call points 
 
The natural cross-ventilation is provided by two opposite walls having openings to the 
open air. The size of these openings is at least 1/2 of the area of each wall, while at 
least 1/2 of the wall area with openings is to be evenly distributed along a length of no 
less than 1/2 the total wall perimeter. 
 
These requirements from the Acceptable Solution C/AS1 imply that for an 
underground or closed parking building, the sprinklers may not be required provided 
other relevant requirements are satisfied. For an open parking building, which is 
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cross-ventilated with at least two opposite sides, there is no specific requirement 
placed by code in terms of the provision of fire protection systems. 
 
1.4.3.2 NFPA 88A – the US 
 
NFPA 88A (National Fire Protection Association, 1998) covers the construction and 
protection of both open and enclosed parking structures. Automatic sprinkler systems 
are not required for open parking structures, which are defined in the standard as those 
structures having more than 20% of wall area open to atmosphere at each level and 
utilising at least two sides of the building. Automatic sprinkler systems are required in 
parking structures with ceiling less than 2 ft (0.61 m) above grade for basement and 
underground parking structures. Automatic sprinkler systems are also required in 
enclosed parking structures of type III or IV construction over 50 ft (15.2 m) in height 
as well as in enclosed parking structures located within or immediately below another 
occupancy. A type III or IV construction refers to the building type with non-
combustible or limited-combustible exterior structural materials, and entirely or 
partially wood interior structural members. A parking structure not meeting the 
classification of an open parking structure is considered enclosed. In enclosed parking 
structures, either a sprinkler system or a fire detection system combined with the 
mechanical ventilation system is required. 
 
1.5 Objectives of Research 
 
This research started with the risk analysis for vehicle fires in New Zealand parking 
buildings based on the historical data. The quantified risk assessment for vehicle fires 
in a parking building was then performed using event tree analysis. Finally a cost-
benefit analysis was carried out for provision of the sprinkler system in a parking 
building.  
 
Marchant (1990) also suggested a quantitative fire engineering approach for multi-
storey car parks to be developed, based on the existing available data for car fires and 
buildings. This article recommended devising a range of fire scenarios assigned with 
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appropriate probabilities. Various features of car parks such as parking layout, 
openness of the building, provision of the sprinklers and potential fire losses, were 
also recommended to be included in the model. 
 
There were therefore three fundamental objectives in this research, which were: 
 
• To obtain the characteristics of vehicle fires in New Zealand parking building 
from study of fire statistics 
• To obtain fire frequencies for different fire spread scenarios by event tree 
analysis of vehicle fires in the Parking Building 
• To develop a cost-benefit analysis model for the provision of a sprinkler 
system in a parking building and perform the analysis using this model 
 
The first objective was achieved by analysing the statistical data from New Zealand 
Fire Service Fire Incident Reporting System (FIRS). The results included the 
frequency of vehicle fires in parking buildings, the type of parking building where 
vehicle fires occurred, the causes of vehicle fires in parking buildings, the frequency 
of the vehicle fire spread in parking buildings, type/age of vehicles involved in fire in 
parking buildings, day/time when vehicle fires occurred, heat source for vehicle fires 
and objects/materials first involved in fire. 
 
The second objective was attained by setting up event tree models according to 
different fire spread scenarios or the number of the vehicles involved in a parking 
building fire. The initiating vehicle fire frequency in parking building was obtained 
from FIRS data and results of a survey done during this research about fire safety in 
New Zealand parking buildings. The relevant probabilities for branches in the event 
tree were obtained from the statistical analysis of New Zealand Fire Service FIRS data. 
Models were set up for both non-sprinklered and sprinklered parking buildings. 
 
The third objective was accomplished by developing a cost-benefit analysis model 
using measure of cost-benefit ratio for the appropriateness of provision of an 
automatic sprinkler system in a parking building. Based on the results from event tree 
model, the relevant benefit and cost for the model were identified and determined as 
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well as the discount rate. The model was applied to a case study using the Monte 
Carlo simulation in @RISK programme where the sensitivities of various inputs were 
also analysed. 
 
1.6 Outline of Report 
 
This report consists of seven chapters. Chapter 2 provides the literature reviews for 
car fire severity tests, car fire tests in parking structures, vehicle fire related modelling, 
sprinkler tests in parking structure, statistics of vehicle fires and parking building fires 
and fire risk analyses. 
 
Chapter 3 deals with the first objective of this research and presents the analyses of 
FIRS statistics for vehicle fires in New Zealand parking buildings. Chapter 4 handles 
the second objective by setting up the event tree model for vehicle fires in New 
Zealand parking buildings, based on the results from Chapter 3. Chapter 5 deals with 
the third objective and presents a cost-benefit analysis of the provision of sprinklers in 
New Zealand parking buildings from the perspective of the parking building owner. 
 
The conclusion and recommendations from this research are given in Chapter 6 and 






Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Experiments on the Severity of Vehicles Fires 
 
2.1.1 Mangs and Keski-Rahkonen (1994a) – Finland 
 
Mangs and Keski-Rahkonen (1994a) described three full scale fire tests on three 
medium size passenger cars manufactured in the late 1970’s. The test car was placed 
on an indoor weighing platform, with a steel tray on the top to collect liquid spill. The 
combustion products were collected by a hood connected to an exhaust duct where 
gas samples were taken for analysis. 
 
In Test 1, one of the doors of the test car was left open slightly and all the windows 
were fully open. In Test 2 and 3, all the doors of the test car were shut; one window 
was completely open with the rest of the windows partially open. 
 
The car in Test 1 was ignited by a tray of heptane positioned under the left front seat 
in the passenger compartment, while in Test 2 and 3 a tray of heptane under the 
engine compartment was used for ignition. The cars in all three tests were left for a 
complete burnout after ignition. 
 
The heat release rate (HRR) and mass loss rate were reported along with heat fluxes 
and temperatures for various locations in each test. The measurements of carbon 
monoxide, carbon dioxide and smoke production rate were also given in the article. 




No.  Vehicle 
 
Test 1  Ford Taunus 1.6 
 
Test 2  Datsun 160J Sedan 
 
Test 3  Datsun 180B Sedan 
 
Figure 2-1: HRR (kW) vs time (min) for three 1970’s car fires, reproduced from Mangs and 
Keski-Rahkonen (1994a) 
 
2.1.2 Shipp and Spearpoint (1995) – the UK 
 
Shipp and Spearpoint (1995) presented results from two full scale fire tests on private 
motor vehicles, commissioned by Channel Tunnel Safety Unit, Department of 
Transport in UK to assess fire safety in the Channel Tunnel shuttle train. To represent 
the worst case fire scenario in a shuttle wagon, the test car was placed under a canopy 
with two sides surrounded by insulated steel cladding. Two calorimeters were 
connected to both ends of the canopy as shown in Figure 2-2. A tray was used to 




Two medium range cars used in tests were a 1982 model Austin Maestro and a 1986 
model Citroen BX. Both cars were loaded with some luggage and papers and the fuel 
tank was three-quarter full. The front windows of test car were left open while doors 
were all closed. Sufficient ventilation was provided into the canopy for both tests. 
 
The Maestro car was ignited by No. 7 crib (BS 5852: Part 2: 1982) within the 
passenger compartment. This fire became intense after 13 minutes, due to the spill of 
petrol from fuel tank. The smoke overflowed out of the experiment rig and flame 
entered the duct causing the loss of some instrumentation. The fire was extinguished 
after 17 minutes. The Citroen was ignited by a tray of petrol placed in the engine 
compartment. In the latter test, fire was not as severe. It was allowed to develop for 57 























Maestro test (seat ignition) 






















Citroen test (engine ignition) Canopy and duct configuration 
 
Figure 2-2: HRR (kW) vs time (min) for two 1980’s car fires and rig layout, reproduced from 




The parameters reported for each test involved HRR, burning rate, gas and surface 
temperatures in and near the car, heat fluxes caused by radiation, toxic product 
concentrations and smoke density. Figure 2-2 shows the HRR as a function of the 
time for both tests. 
 
Visibility reached hazard level in less than five minutes for both tests, according to the 
measurements of toxic product concentration. For the first Maestro car test, authors 
concluded that if there was another car parked at 1 m from the test car, it could have 
ignited after approximately 10 minutes due to radiation from the test car. 
 
2.1.3 Schleich et al. (1999) – Europe 
 
In 1995 and 1996, CTICM in France performed a total of nine car fire tests (Schleich 
et al., 1999) in a calorimeter hood as shown in Figure 2-3; it could accommodate two 
cars and simulated a closed car park. The tests involved different ventilation 
conditions and burning of one or two cars in a single test. The test cars were placed on 
a weighing platform; the combustion products were collected by a hood above the car 
park. Some steel members were placed in the calorimeter hood, and their conditions 
observed when exposed to vehicle fires. 
 
The condition of all the test cars was as in normal use with petrol tank two-thirds full. 
In the first seven tests, the car was ignited by a tray of petrol placed under the left 
front seat. The left front window was fully open, while the right front window was left 
half open. In the last two tests, the ignition was started with 1 litre of petrol under the 
gear box; this was also a test procedure adopted by some car manufactures. The doors 
of cars were closed for all nine tests. 
 
The measurements taken for each test included HRR, mass loss rate, heat fluxes, steel 
temperatures, gas temperatures and toxic products. The first six tests involved cars 
manufactured during the 1980’s and new cars were used in Test 7, 8 and 9. The tests 
showed that the energy released by a car made in 1995 was twice that of a 1980’s car. 




Calorimeter hood Configuration for Test 9 
HRR (MW) vs time (min) for five car fire tests and proposed reference curve 
 
Figure 2-3: Test configurations and HRR curves, reproduced from Schleich et al. (1999) 
 
Based on these tests, the report introduced an HRR reference curve for fire 
engineering design. This curve is shown in Figure 2-3 with the test results. A “wave” 
theory was also proposed in this report to account for the fire spread between multiple 
vehicles in a closed car park. According to this “wave” assumption, the cars will burn 
one after another, with a delay time of 12 minutes. By examining the HRR reference 
curve, one can infer that the fire of first car will start to decay when third car starts to 
ignite at around 24 minutes. It was also concluded that the fire can be confined within 
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single vehicle with the provision of sprinklers or reliable detection system combined 
with adequate fire-fighting equipments.  
 
Table 2-1: Mass loss, total released energy in fire and mean car mass for 1996 European cars, 
reproduced from Schleich et al. (1999) 
category mass loss (kg) released energy (MJ) car mass (kg) 
1 200 6000 850 
2 250 7500 1000 
3 320 9500 1250 
4 400 12000 1400 
5 400 12000 1400 
 
The report classified the cars made in 1996 by European manufacturers into five 
categories as shown in Table 2-1; the mass loss and total released energy in fire and 
mean car mass were listed for cars in each category. The released energy in the table 
was based on a complete burnout of a car with a full fuel tank. 
 
2.1.4 Steinert (2000) – Germany 
 
Steinert (2000) reported a total of ten full scale car fire tests at MFPA, Germany. Cars 
ranging from one to three in each test were put in a closed compartment measuring  
5 m by 7 m with a height of 4.5 m. A 10 m high chimney was installed in this 
compartment, which had an opening 2 m high and 3 m wide as shown in Figure 2-4.  
 
Fire in Test 7 Smoke spilled out of the compartment in Test 8 




Table 2-2 shows the number of cars, fire spread time and parking distance for each 
test. The cars in Test 1, 2 and 3 had different types of car body material. The ages of 
test cars were not reported. 
 
Table 2-2: Summary of ten car fire tests, reproduced from Steinert (2000) 
Test No. 
Number of 
Cars in a 
Single Test 
Car First Ignited
Car Involved in 
Fire by Fire 
Spread 






Test 1 1 Trabant - - - 
Test 2 1 Austin - - - 
Test 3 1 Citroen - - - 
Trabant 30 80 Test 4 3 Golf 
Fiesta 32 80 
Test 5 2 Peugeot Trabant 35 40 
Test 6 2 Trabant Polo 22.5 80 
Test 7 2 Trabant Citroen 12 80 
Test 8 2 Ascona Jetta 52 80 
Test 9a 2 BMW Citroen No spread 80 
Test 9b 2 Trabant Citroen 28.5 80 
 
In each test, one car was ignited first. In Test 4, which involved three cars, the fire 
spread from first to third from the top of the cars; this appeared to indicate that the fire 
reached flashover in the compartment. Fire in this test was manually extinguished at 
around 32 minutes to prevent the test compartment from damage. All other fire 
spreads were by ignition of the combustible materials on the side of the cars. Fire 
spread did not happen in Test 9a. 
 
In Test 8, the smoke produced by car fire overcome the ventilation system and issued 
out of the compartment through the opening as shown in Figure 2-4.  
 
The measurements for each test included temperatures, gas concentrations, heat fluxes, 
mass loss rate and HRR. Figure 2-5 shows the HRR curves for nine car fire tests. The 






















































Test 1,2 & 3 –  single car Test 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9b – multiple cars 
 
Figure 2-5: HRR (kW) vs time (min) for nine car fire tests, reproduced from Steinert (2000) 
 
It was also found from the tests that there are some linear correlations between the 
maximum HRR and the total energy to be released from the test car; Figure 2-6 













 Combustible energy (GJ) 
 
Figure 2-6: Correlation between Maximum HRR (MW) and energy (GJ) from car fire tests, 
reproduced from Steinert (2000) 
 
2.1.5 Stroup et al., (2001) – the US 
 
As part of a fire investigation by the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, two fire tests were carried out in a 1995 passenger 
minivan with some exterior damage. The experiment was conducted under a 4m by 




In the first test, the windows were all closed and fire was started by ignition of 
approximately 0.317 kg of paper in the passenger compartment. The fire went out due 
to lack of the oxygen. In the second test, 2 litres of gasoline was ignited in the 
passenger compartment with the driver and passenger windows open. As the fire 
developed, the closed windows broke and fell out; the condition of burning at this 
point is shown by the photo in Figure 2-7. The fire was extinguished at approximately 
4 minutes (240 s) after ignition. The HRR as a function of the time was shown in 
Figure 2-7, with a peak value of 2.4 MW. Temperatures and gas concentrations were 
also measured at various locations within the passenger compartment during the test. 
 
HRR (kW) vs time (min) Burning after the crack of front window 
 
Figure 2-7: HRR (kW) vs time (min) for a minivan fire and a test photo, reproduced from Stroup 









2.1.6 Work by General Motors – the US 
 
2.1.6.1 Fires with Ignition in the Engine Compartment 
 
General Motors conducted a fire initiation and propagation test project under an 
agreement with the United States Department of Transportation. The objectives of this 
project were to examine the ignition mechanism of post crash vehicle fires and the fire 
severity. 
 
As part of the project, three fire tests (Santrock, 1996, 2002a, 2003b) were performed 
on crash tested vehicles at Factory Mutual test centre to obtain the behaviour of fire 
spread from the engine compartment into the passenger compartment. The 
measurements taken for each test included air temperatures, heat fluxes and 
combustion gas concentrations all in the passenger compartment, as well as the HRR. 




Figure 2-8: Fire products collector at the Factory Mutual test centre for test Part 3, reproduced 




HRR(kW) vs Time (min) After the fire test 
Test Part 3 
 
HRR(kW) vs Time (min) Before the fire test 
Test Part 7 
 
HRR(kW) vs Time (min) Before the fire test 
Test Part 13 
 
Figure 2-9: HRR (kW) vs time (min) for vehicle fires with ignition in engine compartment, 
reproduced from Santrock (1996, 2002a, 2003b) 
 
Table 2-3 summarises the test date, vehicle details, ignition method and fire 
extinguishing time for three tests. The recorded HRR and car photo for each of the 
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three tests are shown in Figure 2-9. In each test, the fire was not allowed a full 
burnout and extinguished at some stage after the fire spread into the passenger 
compartment. Consequently the HRR did not reach the peak value and only show the 
growth phase. 
 
Table 2-3: Summary of three vehicle fires with ignition in engine compartment 
Report 




Part 3 November 13, 1996 
I996 Dodge 
Caravan Sport 
battery and power distribution 
ignited by an electrical ignitor 11 minutes 
Part 7 October 1, 1997 
1997 Chevrolet 
Camaro 
A propane torch was used for 
ignition in the engine compartment 16 minutes 
Part 13 February 23, 1999 
1998 Honda 
Accord 
ignition of methanol vapour in the 
windshield washer fluid reservoir 
by burning power steering fluid 
27 minutes 
 
2.1.6.2 Fires as a Result of Pool Fire under the Vehicle 
 
As part of the project introduced in section 2.1.6.1, four other fire tests (Santrock, 
2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2003a) were done on crash tested vehicles to study the spread 
of an underbody fuel pool fire into the passenger compartment. The measurements 
taken for each test included air temperatures, heat fluxes, combustion gas 
concentrations, and the HRR. The experiment setups similar to that in Figure 2-8 were 
used. Table 2-4 lists the test date, vehicle details, ignition method and fire 
extinguishing time for four tests. 
 
The measured HRR curve for each of these four tests is shown in Figure 2-10. Similar 
to other three tests introduced in section 2.1.6.1, the fire was not allowed a full 
burnout and extinguished at some stage after the fire spread from pool fire into the 
passenger compartment. As a result, the HRR did not reach the peak value and only 















Part 6 September 30, 1997 
1997 Chevrolet 
Camaro Underbody gasoline pool fire 210 seconds 
Part 9 June 9, 1998 
1998 Ford 
Explorer Rear-underbody gasoline pool fire 170 seconds 
Part 10 June 11, 1998 
1998 Ford 
Explorer Mid-underbody gasoline pool fire 250 seconds 
Part 12 February 25, 1999 
1998 Honda 
Accord Underbody gasoline pool fire 155 seconds 
 
Test Part 6 Test Part 9 
Test Part 10 Test Part 12 
 
Figure 2-10: HRR (kW) vs time (min) for vehicle fires initiated by fuel pool fire, reproduced from 





2.1.6.3 Fires with Flame Retardant Materials Involved 
 
General Motors also conducted another project under the same agreement with the 
United States Department of Transportation. The objective of this project was to 
investigate the effects of substituting plastic resins containing flame retardant 





Figure 2-11: HRR (kW) vs time (min) for fires of control and FR vehicles, reproduced from 
Santrock (2002e) 
 
Two full scale fire tests were carried out on two crash tested 1999 Chevrolet Camaros 
cars (Santrock, 2002e). One vehicle was unmodified and designated as control vehicle, 
while another vehicle contained flame retardant chemicals in the HVAC module and 
designated FR vehicle. For both tests, the experiment setups, ignition methods and 
measurements taken were similar to the fire initiation and propagation test project 
reviewed in section 2.1.6.1 and 2.1.6.2. Both fire tests were extinguished at 13 
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minutes after ignition. It was found that the plastic materials containing flame 
retardant chemicals did not affect the behaviour of fire spread from the engine 
compartment into the passenger compartment. The measured HRR curves and test car 
photos taken before test are shown in Figure 2-11. 
 
2.1.7 Small Scale Tests – the US 
 
2.1.7.1 Work at NIST 
 
A series of experiments were done to assess the fire hazard after a motor vehicle 
accident, under a cooperative research agreement between General Motors and 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the US. 
 
The effectiveness of a passive fire protection technology involving intumescent paints 
and caulks was examined in simulated post crash vehicle fires (Hamins, 1998). It was 
found that the coating lowered heat conduction through the metal panel. However the 
coating failed to prevent the flames from penetrating holes, some of which were as 
small as 6 mm in diameter. 
 
The data measurements for combustible liquids including fire points, flame height, 
heat flux and ignition time were taken to assess the fire behaviour following fuel 
spilling caused by motor vehicle crash (Ohlemiller and Cleary, 1998). Some selected 
combustible parts from a minivan were also burned and fire hazard parameters such as 
HRR, mass loss rate and heat flux were obtained (Ohlemiller and Shields, 1998). 
 
2.1.7.2 Janssens et al. (2004) 
 
Janssens et al. (2004) presented a small scale test methodology of rating automotive 
materials. The test was engaged by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) in the US. Eighteen exterior automotive parts from a 
passenger van and a sport coupe were tested in the cone calorimeter. Based on these 
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test data, a model was shown to predict fire growth, for certain materials in post crash 
vehicle fires originating in the engine compartment. 
 
2.1.8 Design Fire of Single Vehicle Fire 
 
Table 2-5 lists a range of approximate maximum HRR values quoted by Ingason 
(2001) and Shipp (2002) for various types of vehicles. The HRR figures from Ingason 
(2001) were for the condition of road tunnel ventilation. 
 
Table 2-5: Maximum HRR of vehicle fires, reproduced from Ingason (2001) and Shipp (2002) 
Maximum HRR (MW) Type of vehicles 
Ingason (2001) Shipp (2002) 
Small passenger car 2.5 
Large passenger car 5 8 
2-3 passenger cars 8 - 
Van 15 - 
Truck - 17 
Bus 20 - 
School bus - 30 
Lorry with burning goods (general case) 20-30 - 
Train - 13-50 
Subway coach - 35 
Heavy goods vehicle (HGV) - 120 
Petrol tanker 200 - 
 
Figure 2-12 shows various HRR curves from the historical literature presented earlier 
(section 2.1), along with slow and medium t-squared fire HRR curves for comparison. 
The definition of t-squared or power law fire growth can be found in Chapter 2-2, 
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering (DiNenno, 2002). The test reported 
by Mangs and Keski-Rahkonen (1994a) gave relatively low magnitude of HRR for all 
three tests, thus only Test 2 was chosen to represent this study. The study described by 
Schleich et al. (1999) was represented by the proposed reference HRR curve. Single 
vehicle fire test by Steinert (2000) yielded relatively low HRR, hence only Test 3 was 
shown to represent this work. The vehicle fire test carried out by Stroup et al. (2001) 
was not allowed a full burnout and hence not shown for comparison. Similarly, the 
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tests by General Motors were also not shown (Santrock, 1996; 2002a, b, c, d, e; 2003a, 
b). 
 
The HRR curve for Maestro car by Shipp and Spearpoint (1995) and the reference 
HRR curve by Schleich et al. (1999) show almost same peak HRR value (about  
8 MW); this peak value is also higher than other tests shown in the graph. In fact, the 
Maestro car test involved fuel spill from the petrol tank and thus caused the relatively 
high HRR peak reached 10 minutes earlier than the reference HRR curve. The peak 






















Schleich et al. (1999) - Reference Curve
Shipp and Spearpoint (1995) - Maestro
Shipp and Spearpoint (1995) - Citroen
Steinert (2000) - Test 3
Mangs and Keski-Rahkonen (1994a) - Test 2
 
 
Figure 2-12: Comparison of HRR curves from various car fire experiments 
 
From the Figure 2-12, it can be seen that the Maestro car HRR curve can be 
represented by a medium t-squared fire, while the reference HRR curve follows a 
slow t-squared fire. All other HRR curves fit between slow and medium t-squared 
fires. A growth rate between slow and medium seems to be appropriate for a t-squared 
vehicle design fires; a peak value of 8 MW can be used for a worst case scenario. It 
should be noted that the HRR data discussed here are for passenger vehicles only. 
 
According to the HRR curves in Figure 2-12, there appears to be a trend that more 
modern cars yield a higher maximum HRR than old generation cars when involved in 
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fire. Ingason (2001) observed a tendency of maximum HRR increasing linearly with 
the total energy to be released from passenger cars, and further proposed that an 
average increase of 0.7 MW in maximum HRR can be expected from one GJ of 
energy. This value is within the range of HRR vs energy (0.55 to 0.85 MW/GJ) shown 
by Steinert (2000). 
 
Additional introductions about HRR data for transport vehicles and components can 
also be found in Chapter 3-1, SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering 
(DiNenno, 2002) where Babrauskas shows HRR curves for half a tram car and vehicle 
seatings. 
 
2.2 Experiments of Vehicle Fires in Parking Structures 
 
2.2.1 Butcher et al. (1968) – the UK 
 
Butcher et al. (1968) reported three car fire tests in a specially built steel scaffolding 
structure shown in Figure 2-13, with an insulated ceiling approximately 2.1m above 
the floor. The two ends of the structure were left open for the first and second tests, 
and closed for the third test. Nine cars in a three by three array were arranged with 
parallel spacings ranging from 0.75 m to 1.2 m. The tanks of all tested cars were filled 
with 23 litres of petrol and a considerable amount of combustible material was also 
put inside the car to represent the luggage. 
 
The car located in the centre was ignited first in each test. The windows of ignited car 
were all closed except for the driver seat window, which was left half open. After 
ignition, the flames were observed out of windows at 8.3 and 12 minutes for first test 
and second test respectively. The condition at two minutes before full development of 
the fire in Test 2 can be seen in Figure 2-13. The fire was reported burning through 
the fabric section of the roof for Test 3 where a small soft top saloon was used and 




General building assembly Fire seen two minutes before full development in Test 2 
 
Figure 2-13: Car fire test photos, reproduced from Butcher et al. (1968) 
 
The temperatures of the hot air under the suspended ceiling and structural steel around 
the ignited car were recorded during the test. The highest temperatures of gas and 
steel were 840°C and 360°C respectively; these temperatures were both reached 
during Test 2. The temperature for any non-combustible structural element never 
reached the critical condition. The measurements of radiation from ignited car to 
adjacent cars and smoke density in the structure were also taken. Based on the visual 
observation, the smoke layer was primarily confined at ceiling level. 
 
The conclusions from this report can be summarised as follows: 
 
• A fire in a single parked vehicle is unlikely to cause uncontrollable fire spread 
within a car park 
• The damage to the car park building is not critical, if the structure is built from 
non-combustible material with sufficient structural strength and appropriate 
durability 
 
In this study, the wood equivalent fire load density for a car park was found to be 17 





2.2.2 Burgi (1971) – Switzerland 
 
Burgi (1971) reported three sets of car fire tests carried out in a factory building 
designated for demolition. This was a closed structure of irregular shape with an area 
of 525 m2 and a ceiling height of 3.7 m. The sprinklers were installed to assess the 
effectiveness of the fire extinguishing system. The cars used in the test were all 
obsolete vehicles with petrol tanks two-thirds full. The front windows of the ignited 
car were left half open. The air temperatures inside the structure were measured 
during all tests. 
 
  
Test 1 – Fire at 28 minutes after ignition Test 3 – Fire at 1 minute 20 seconds after ignition 
 
Figure 2-14: Car fire test photos, reproduced from Burgi (1971) 
 
The first test involved three cars, parked with normal spacing between each, on a 
platform 1 m high. The centre car, containing a carton of combustible objects, was 
first ignited by electric soldering iron. The fire smouldered for 18 minutes, at which 
point windows broke and the fire became more severe (due to sufficient ventilation 
within the compartment). Sprinkler system was activated by fire at 28.5 minutes and 
two minutes later smoke completely filled the structure. The fire did not spread to the 
adjacent cars. Figure 2-14 shows the test condition at 28 minutes, which was a half 
minute before the sprinklers activated. 
 
The second test involved two cars sitting on the floor with a parallel parking distance 
of 0.5 m. A torch was used for ignition of the test car. An immediate severe fire was 
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observed after ignition. The sprinkler system operated at 40 seconds after ignition and 
water from the sprinklers carried the burning petrol towards the adjacent car, thus 
igniting the front tyre of this car. The activation of the sprinklers also increased the 
smoke spread. 
 
The configuration of the third test was similar to the second test, except for the 
ignition which was started by petrol in a container placed under the car to simulate 
arson. The test condition at 1 minute 20 seconds after ignition can be found in  
Figure 2-14. Intensive fire development was observed in the ignited car; the fire was 
finally extinguished with foam. The side and left rear tyre of the adjacent car was 
damaged. 
 
In this study, the fire development within a burning car was found to be dependant on 
the oxygen supply or ventilation condition in vehicle and ignition method. It was also 
observed that sprinklers cannot extinguish the fire inside the vehicle. The air 
temperature inside the structure was tolerable in terms of the tenability for human. 
Visibility was not impaired by smoke production until after the sprinklers activated, 
causing complete loss of vision within seconds. 
 
The conclusion of this work can be summarised as follows: 
 
• Smoke is the main hazard in a car park building in the event of a vehicle fire 
• Automatic fire extinguishing systems may be necessary, depending on the type, 
size, location and available fire fighting equipment of the car park building 
 
2.2.3 Gewain (1973) – the US 
 
Gewain (1973) reported a full scale burnout car fire test sponsored by American Iron 
and Steel Institute. This was carried out in a multi-storey open air parking structure, 
constructed from unprotected steel frames and concrete decks, in Scranton, USA. The 
outside view of this parking structure is shown in Figure 2-15. The level just below 
the top level of the structure was used for this test. Cars were parked above the test 




Parking structure used for test Burning vehicle with visible flame during the test 
Figure 2-15: Car fire test photos, reproduced from Gewain (1973) 
 
Three current model cars were used in the test, with all windows partially open to 
encourage the fire development. These cars were also loaded with combustibles and 
filled with 38 litres (10 gallons) of petrol. 
 
The car at the centre was ignited first. The burning was then left uncontrolled and 
lasted for 48 minutes. Two other cars, which were parked less than 0.6 m (2 ft) from 
the test car, received minor damage. The author stated that the maximum steel 
temperature recorded during the test was 227°C (440°F) and well below the limiting 
temperature of 593°C (1100°F) as required by NFPA Standard No. 251 for such 
structural elements. The maximum air temperature was reported as 432°C (810°F) 
above the windscreen at 11 minutes after ignition; the air temperatures for most parts 
in the structure were below 204°C (400°F). Both deflection and elongation of the 
structural elements were recorded as zero after cooling. The author concluded that: 
 
• There is a very low fire hazard in an open air parking structure 
• Exposed steel provides adequate safety against the structure collapse under the 
circumstance of a car fire 
• The results confirm those from similar tests by Butcher et al. (1968) and Burgi 
(1971) 
 
The wood equivalent fire load density for a car park was found to be 9.8 kg/m2  




2.2.4 Australian Tests at BHP 
 
2.2.4.1 Bennetts et al. (1985) – in Open-Deck Car Park 
 
Bennetts et al. (1985) reported two fire tests in a two-level open-deck car park 
structure built from unprotected steel at BHP Melbourne Research Laboratories. The 
structure was loaded by placing concentrated loads on first floor, as shown in Figure 
2-16. For both tests, five cars were parked on ground floor with a spacing of 0.4 m. 
The left front window of the test car was left half open. The petrol tanks were half full 
for all cars used in the test, except for the test car in second test, which was filled to 
80%. The test car used in Test 1 had a steel fuel tank while the test car in Test 2 had a 
plastic fuel tank and an LPG tank. Both air and steel temperatures were measured 
throughout the two tests. 
 
 
Open test structure Fire in Test 2 
 
Figure 2-16: Car fire test photos, reproduced from Bennetts et al. (1985) 
 
In Test 1, the front windscreen broke at one minute after the ignition. The petrol tank 
filler pipe was involved in fire at 25 minutes. The burning of this car lasted for 70 
minutes and fire did not spread to adjacent cars. Large amounts of pungent smoke 




In Test 2, windscreen and windows in the test car shattered soon after ignition. The 
fire spread from the car first ignited to two neighbouring cars at 14 and 35 minutes 
respectively. A photo taken during this test can be seen in Figure 2-16. 
 
The maximum steelwork temperatures recorded were 285°C for Test 1 and 340°C for 
Test 2 respectively. The authors of this report concluded that a significant safety 
margin can be achieved with the unprotected steel structure under the fire situation in 
an open-deck car park. 
 
2.2.4.2 BHP (1987) – in Closed Car Park 
 
A total of nine tests (BHP 1987) were performed in a closed car park building as 
shown in Figure 2-17, which was modified from the car park structure used in 
previous open-deck car fire tests. Twenty cars were used in these tests with various 
parking configurations; one photo in Figure 2-17 shows one of the vehicle 
arrangements. A sprinkler system was installed with a typical layout as permitted 
under AS2118 – 1982. A mechanical ventilation system was also installed in the test 
building. The measurements taken during the tests included inside air temperature, 
steel temperature, smoke optical density, carbon monoxide concentration, hydrogen 
chloride concentration and hydrogen cyanide concentration. 
 
The fire in test car was initiated by igniting one kilogram of rag soaked with one litre 
of petrol under the front seat for all tests, except for Test 8 where the fire was started 
by the ignition of an open dish containing four litres of petrol placed under the petrol 
tank. 
 
For five tests where the sprinkler system was operated manually, the fire burnt 
through the test car. In two of the tests where more recent cars were used, the fire 
spread from the test car to those cars parked at both sides and rear. The maximum 
temperature in steel reached above 400°C in these tests and smoke and toxic products 




For the remaining three tests where the operation of sprinkler system was automatic, 
the fire was rapidly controlled and confined within the test car. The fire spreading 
between parked cars did not happen and the maximum steel temperature was less than 
100°C. The amount and duration of the production of smoke and toxic products were 
also reported to have been reduced. 
 
Closed test structure Vehicles before the test with sprinklers installed overhead 
Thick smoke emitting out of the structure 
during the test View inside structure during the test 
 
Figure 2-17: Car fire test photos, reproduced from BHP (1987) 
 
Smoke was observed to fill the building rapidly in all eight tests and the subsequent 
untenable condition could pose a hazard to life safety; this can be seen from one photo 
in Figure 2-17. The conclusion reached in this report was that the sprinkler system 




2.2.4.3 Bennetts et al. (1990) – in Partially Closed Car Park and 
Mixed Occupancy Building 
 
Bennetts et al. (1990) reported a series of 14 fire tests, carried out at BHP Melbourne 
Research Laboratories, in a structure constructed from unprotected steel to simulate a 
building containing an office floor over a car park. A range of openings in the 
building were tested in this program to represent a partially closed car park. 
 
The first three tests involved five cars with the fire ignited in one car; there were 30 
litres of petrol left in the tank. Recent model cars were chosen at the time of the 
experiment. The following 11 fire tests were achieved by burning measured quantities 
of petrol in open dishes located at each side of the car park to investigate the effect of 
the different ventilation conditions in the structure. 
 
A sprinkler system was installed in the building; the ventilation of the building was by 
natural means. Similar to the tests in a closed car park (section 2.2.4.2), the 
measurements taken in this test program included inside air temperature, steel 
temperature, smoke optical density, carbon monoxide concentration, hydrogen 
chloride and hydrogen cyanide concentration. The large quantity of black smoke 
generated in fire was observed in all the tests; this can be seen from the photo on left 
in Figure 2-18 for a test using five vehicles. 
 
Smoke produced from car fire issuing out 
of the car park structure 
Flame and smoke reaching the office 
window above the car park 
 




In this report, the authors concluded that: 
 
• There is no need for fire protection of the steel work in a partially closed car 
park with a functioning sprinkler system 
• The conditions in the partially closed car park in this test program were similar 
to those found in the closed car park 
• One should treat a car park, not complying with the requirements for an open 
deck structure, as a closed car park when determining fire protection measures 
 
A further two tests, where the fire was started in various locations in the office above 
the car park, were also reported (BHP, 1990) from the same test program. It was 
found that the office fires did not present a hazard to the car park structure below, due 
to the fact that the direction of spreading of heat and flame through the window was 
upward. It was therefore concluded in the report that the requirement for a supporting 
structure to have equivalent fire resistance to that which it supports, as set in the 
Building Code of Australia, is not suitable for structural components appropriately 
separated or in different compartments. 
 
2.2.5 Schleich et al. (1999) – Netherlands 
 
Two full scale tests (Schleich et al., 1999) were performed in a semi-closed concrete 
car park in Amsterdam, 1996. This car park was a concrete structure measuring 55 m 
by 85 m with a height of 3 m. 
 
Three cars more than ten years old were parked in parallel as shown in Figure 2-19, 
with separation distances at 0.5 m and 0.7 m between the cars. The fuel tank of the 
middle car was half full; the other two cars had 10 litres of petrol in the tank. The fire 
was started from middle car by ignition of fuel in a steel tray underneath the front seat. 
The measurements taken during the test included gas temperatures under the ceiling, 






Figure 2-19: Car fire test photo, reproduced from Schleich et al. (1999 
 
In Test 1, the windows of all the cars were closed. Consequently, the fire in the test 
car went out within three minutes of ignition due to oxygen depletion. 
 
In Test 2, one window on each side of the test car was half open to allow adequate 
ventilation. Within eight minutes, fire in the first car spread to second car parked  
0.5 m away. Ignition of the second car started with window rubber and tyre. At  
15.5 minutes, fire spread to car on the other side. Visibility was reported as very low 
at this time. The fire-fighters extinguished the fire at 17.5 minutes after the ignition of 
first car. The authors suggested that parking distance could determine the time needed 
for occurrence of fire spread between cars. 
 
2.2.6 Anon (2000) – France 
 
CTICM built a two-level car park using unprotected steel work and concrete slab 
construction in Vernon, France and conducted a full scale fire test in this structure 
(Anon, 2000). The car park shown in Figure 2-20 measured 15 m by 32 m; the height 




Three up-market cars parked in parallel were used in the test. The middle car was 
ignited first by a tray containing 1.5 litres of heptane under the gearbox. The 
measurements taken during the test included: ambient temperatures in the vehicle and 
structure, temperatures of the structural elements, vertical and horizontal 
displacements of the structural elements exposed to the fire, wind velocity and 
orientation. 
 
Purpose built open car park structure One minute after the ignition 
Nine minutes after the ignition Twenty-one minutes after the ignition 
 
Figure 2-20: Car fire test photos, reproduced from Anon (2000) 
 
At four minutes after ignition of the middle car, the fuel tank was involved causing 
spill of preheated fuel on the ground. The fire then spread to two other cars parked on 
both sides. The fire development was most severe from three to ten minutes after 
ignition; during this time flame was seen extending out of the car park and reaching 
one or two metres above the upper level of the structure. The fire started to decay at 
15 minutes after ignition and was close to extinction at 35 minutes after ignition. It 
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was considered that the wind condition had contributed to the rapid development of 
fire spread. The progress of the fire can be seen from photos in Figure 2-20. 
 
The average temperature inside vehicles was around 900°C during the test; the 
temperature recorded at 10 m from the vehicles was about 250°C. The maximum 
temperature of steelwork reached 650°C in the lower flange of a composite beam 
above the test area; this temperature was recorded during the time period between 15 
to 20 minutes after ignition. The beam exposed to fire showed a deflection of 40 mm 
after cooling; the breakage of three bolts was found on the end plate connecting the 
main beam and central column of the structure. Nevertheless, the report concluded 
that the stability of the structure was not affected, under the circumstance of this 
rapidly developing fire involving three vehicles. 
 
Another paper described a second test involving three vehicles in the same car park 
structure and gave the similar results (Kruppa and Zhao 2002). 
 
2.2.7 Kitano et al. (2000) – Japan 
 
A large scale fire test was performed in a specially built car park structure in Japan 
(Kitano et al., 2000). This was a four-storey structure with a maximum height of 
around 10 m; the floor measured 30 m by 20 m. The structure as shown in Figure 2-21 
was constructed from unprotected steelwork with two adjoining sides thermally 
insulated by autoclaved aerated concrete boards; the remaining two sides of the 
structure were left open. 
 
In order to examine the burning behaviour of the vehicle and performance of the steel 
frame for the worst case scenario, 12 cars were placed at insulated corners on each 
level of the car park. These test cars were arranged as a two by six array. 
 
The fire was started from a vehicle on first floor and finally involved seven other cars 
because of the radiation feedback from the ceiling and insulated wall. A photo 
showing the fire spread can be found in Figure 2-21. First fire spread occurred at 8.5 
minutes and second and third fire spread happened at 19 minutes and 23 minutes 
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respectively. The subsequent two fire spreads took place at 25 minutes; the final two 
fire spreads occurred at 43 minutes. The fire was extinguished shortly after this time. 
 
Four-storey car park structure Fire spread between cars during the test 
 
Figure 2-21: Car fire test photos, reproduced from Kitano et al. (2000) 
 
The steel temperatures were measured during the test; the maximum steel temperature 
was recorded as 700°C at the beam immediately above the car first ignited. The 
structural deflections were also measured and the deformations were found to be 
between 1/4 and 1/3 of the critical value. However the measured strain of one column 
reached the plastic region. The report concluded that the car park structure did not 




Various car fire experiments from literature have been described in this section. The 
fire tests in open structures were reported by Butcher et al. (1968), Gewain (1973), 
Bennetts et al. (1985), Schleich et al. (1999), and Anon (2000). The fire tests in closed 
structures were described by Burgi (1971), BHP (1987), Bennetts et al. (1990), and 
Kitano et al. (2000). The sprinklers were installed in the tests reported by Burgi 
(1971), BHP (1987) and Bennetts et al. (1990). These car fire tests in structures were 
mainly trying to investigate: 
 
• the behaviours of car fire and fire spread to adjacent cars in a parking structure 
• the effect of car fires on structure of the parking building 
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• the performance of the sprinklers under the situation of car fires 
 
These tests indicated that the fire can spread between the cars, especially in closed 
parking structures. The results from all the tests further showed the stability of the 
structure exposed to the car fires. The test results also highlighted the potential hazard 
to human life safety posed by large amounts of smoke produced in car fires, 
particularly in the condition of those closed type parking structures. The Australian 
tests (BHP, 1987; Bennetts et al., 1990) demonstrated the effectiveness of sprinklers 
to control the car fire development; whereas the Swiss test (Burgi, 1971) showed that 
the water from sprinklers shifted the burning petrol to adjacent vehicles. 
 
2.3 Simulation and Modelling Based on Experimental Results 
 
This section describes a number of studies, which were concentrated on simulation 
and modelling for the vehicle fire and its effect on structure. These studies used 
previous experimental results of vehicle fires either as input of the modelling or for 
comparison with the modelling results. Barber and Proe (2001) also presented some 
case studies of fire engineering design of parking buildings using published car fire 
test data. 
 
2.3.1 Studies Based on the Severity of Vehicle Fires 
 
2.3.1.1 Mangs and Keski-Rahkonen (1994b) – Finland 
 
Mangs and Keski-Rahkonen (1994b) used two fire plumes, consisting of one at front 
window and another at rear window, to describe the car fire. One Boltzmann curve 
and three symmetrical Gaussian curves were then applied to represent the 
experimental HRR curves described in section 2.1.1 (Mangs and Keski-Rahkonen, 
1994a). These parametric HRR curves were then used to calculate the gas temperature 
above a burning car, by Alpert’s equations for maximum ceiling jet temperature. The 
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calculation results showed good agreement with the experimental measurements 
(Mangs and Keski-Rahkonen, 1994a). 
 
2.3.1.2 Kumar (1994) – UK 
 
Kumar (1994) proposed a car HRR curve comprising an early slow growth phase and 
a later fast growth phase. The results of Maestro car fire test described in section 2.1.2 
by Shipp and Spearpoint (1995) were used to calibrate and verify this HRR curve. The 
first growth phase represented the car seat first ignited during the test, while the 
second growth phase stands for the further involvement of the ceiling material and 
other seats within passenger compartment of the test car. The HRR curve was then 
used in a field model JASMINE to simulate the thermal and chemical characteristics 
of a vehicle fire in a Channel Tunnel shuttle wagon in transit. It was reported that the 
simulation results showed satisfactory agreement with experimental measurements 
from a full scale test involving car fires in a double decker shuttle wagon. 
 
2.3.1.3 Schleich et al. (1999) – Europe 
 
Schleich et al. (1999) presented simulations and results using CFD programmes 
(VESTA and FLUENT) to assess the behaviours of structure when exposed to vehicle 
fires in a closed car park. The input HRR curve in the modelling was based on work 
by Mangs and Keski-Rahkonen (1994a). Some design rules for steel structures were 
introduced for the situation of enclosed car parks as follows: 
 
• Single vehicle fire – the unprotected steel structure with continuous composite 
beams is recommended 
• Multiple vehicle fires – the steel structure needs to be composed of protected 





2.3.2 Studies Based on Vehicle Fires in Parking Structures 
 
2.3.2.1 Kruppa and Zhao (2002) – France 
 
Kruppa and Zhao (2002) carried out two-dimensional modelling using programme 
SISMEF and three-dimensional modelling using programme ANSYS, to analyse the 
structural behaviour of the parking structure during fire test in car park described in 
section 2.2.6 (Anon, 2000). They compared the results of steel member deflection 
from numerical analysis with those from experiments, and concluded that the 
numerical analysis can conservatively predict the behaviours of structure exposed to 
vehicle fires as shown in the car park fire test. 
 
2.3.2.2 Hirashima et al. (2003) – Japan 
 
Hirashima et al. (2003) presented the two-dimensional structural analysis of thermal 
stresses and deflections for the fire test in car park (Kitano et al., 2000) as described in 
section 2.2.7. Similar to the result from experiment, the numerical analysis showed 
that the frame of car park structure used in the fire test did not collapse. The 
displacements of the steel frame from the numerical analysis also showed 
approximate agreements with the fire test results. This paper also concluded that the 
large curvature can develop at outer columns of the structure as a result of the thermal 
elongation of beam, if the frame is restrained for horizontal displacement at footings. 
 
2.4 Experiments on Performance of the Sprinkler System in 
Parking Buildings 
 
2.4.1 Stephens (1992) – the UK 
 
Stephens (1992) reported three full scale sprinkler tests in a 30 m by 30 m area with a 
height of 9 m at Fire Research Station’s Cardington Laboratory. The fire involved a 
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number of double-decker buses (ranging from three to six) parked at a separation 
distance of 0.45 m, with three seats ignited simultaneously within one of the buses. 
 
The sprinkler heads, installed in dry pipe system, were glass bulb type with 
temperature rating of 68°C and RTI of 200 m1/2s1/2. The results indicated that a 
discharge density of 14 mm/min was required to prevent the fire spreading between 
the parked buses, with ignition within one bus. However this discharge density did not 
restrain the fire spread within the burning bus. The discharge density of 5 and 10 
mm/min failed to prevent the fire from spreading to adjacent buses. The test also 
showed that the time delay between sprinkler opening and water discharging from the 
system is a critical factor for the effectiveness of sprinkler system. 
 
2.4.2 Arvidson et al. (1997) – Holland 
 
Another full scale sprinkler test (Arvidson et al., 1997) was carried out in a bus garage 
in Holland in 1988. This was a structure with an area of 562 m2 and sloped ceiling. 
The maximum ceiling height was 6 m and roof was divided into three smoke 
reservoirs. Three buses were parked at a gap of 1 m, with front doors open. The bus in 
the middle, with fuel tank two-thirds full, was ignited first. The fuel tanks of the other 
two buses were left empty. 
 
The sprinkler system consisted of 40 sprinklers and each sprinkler covered an average 
area of 8 m2. The sprinkler heads were of upright conventional type with solder links 
having a temperature rating of 74°C. A total of 12 sprinklers activated and the 
discharge densities varied from 14.4 mm/min to 22.5 mm/min. The fire spread to 
adjacent buses did not occur and the ceiling temperatures were reduced after operation 







2.5 Statistical Studies of Vehicle Fires 
 
2.5.1 General Vehicle Fires 
 
2.5.1.1 In the UK 
 
Butler (1986) examined the causes and origins of the vehicle fires in Ireland and the 
UK, as well as the fatalities of young children in parked car fires. According to this 
article, fire brigades in Britain attended 45,000 motor vehicle fires per year, which 
caused approximately £45,000,000 worth of fire damage. Arson was reported to have 
caused 15% of motor vehicle fires. For non-collision vehicle fires, 35% of the 
incidents started from the passenger compartment and approximately 60% of the 
incidents originated in the engine compartment. In the UK from 1977 to 1982, there 
were nine children fatalities from eight fire incidents in parked cars, some of which 
were in parking buildings. 
 
Chief-Inspector of Fire Service (1988) in the UK reported that the number of road 
vehicle fires almost doubled between 1976 and 1986 to 47,680. The cause for more 
than half (57%) of the vehicle fire increase was due to deliberate action or arson. 
Moore (1992) also reported the number of all vehicle fires in the UK having increased 
by 68% to 57,000, in a ten-year period from 1981 to 1990. In this article, the largest 
percentage of vehicle fires in UK was quoted to have occurred in vehicles of eight 
years old. 
 
Based on the results of two surveys carried out in Lincolnshire in the UK, Moore 
(1989) listed the common causes of car fires as: electrical faults, fuel leaks/draining 
down of fuel tanks, welding or hot cutting and carelessness. Arson was not included 
in these causes. Whitaker (1989) also analysed the details of vehicle fire statistics in 
the UK and claimed that the collection of additional details for incidents is required, 
to show the vehicle fire cause and trend more clearly. Sandel (1991) discussed the 
details of petrol igniting on hot surfaces and recommended more accurate measures of 
reporting the vehicle fire causes. In 1999, the cause of 70% of road vehicle fires in the 
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UK was attributed to deliberate ignition except for buses (Shipp, 2002); this happened 
mainly on parked vehicles. 
 
Chandler and Shipp (1995) described a statistical study to assess the fire safety 
provisions for the Channel Tunnel shuttle trains, based on fire statistics in the UK. 
The minimum estimated risks were reported as one death per every 600 fires and one 
injury per every 100 fires. The fire frequency in car carrying shuttle trains was 
estimated as one to three fires per year. The fire risks to life safety in the Channel 
Tunnel were also shown in this study as one death in every 1,500 years and one 
casualty in every 200 years. The article also suggested that the occurrence of fire is 
not time related if a vehicle engine has been kept on or off for more than 20 minutes. 
 
2.5.1.2 In the US 
 
A study (Trisko, 1975) was commissioned by the Insurance Institute for Highway 
Safety in the US to survey 51 participating fire departments to investigate national 
motor vehicle fires. The categories examined were origin of fire, age of vehicle, make 
of vehicle and collision related incidents. 
 
Tessmer (1994) analysed fire occurrence in fatal and less serious crashes, considering 
characteristics of crash, vehicle involved, and driver. The analysis was based on the 
statistical data from the Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS), Michigan Police 
Accident Report (PAR), and National Accident Sampling System Crashworthiness 
Data System (NASS CDS). Light trucks were found being more susceptible to be 
involved in fires than cars or vans. The older cars were more likely to be involved in 
post crash fire than newer cars. A car hit in the rear in a fatal crash is approximately 
3.4 times more likely to have a severe fire than one struck from the front. It was also 
found that a crashed vehicle with fuel leak is 52.8 times more likely to have a fire than 
a vehicle without fuel leak. 
 
A report (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2001) based on data from US 
Fire Administration’s National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) examined 
highway vehicle fires in the US in 1998. The leading causes of the vehicle fires were 
 
 50
mechanical or design problems, while electrical wiring and fuel were leading forms of 
material ignited. Fires subsequent to the crash caused most vehicle related fatalities. 
 
Ahrens (2001) investigated the trends and characteristics of vehicle fires based on 
data from National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)’s annual fire experience 
survey and the NFIRS. The types of the vehicles included passenger road, freight road, 
rail transport, water transport, air transport, heavy equipment and special. The report 
included the categories such as location of fire, causes of vehicle fire, areas of fire 
origin, forms and types of material first ignited, as well as the time of the incident. 
 
Cole (1988) examined 233 vehicle fires and found that two significant causes were 
fuel leaks (94 cases) and electrical shorts (42 cases). The 94 cases of fuel leaks 
included 45 carburettor or carburettor inlet leaks. 
 
2.5.2 Vehicle Fires in Parking Buildings 
 
2.5.2.1 Harris (1972) – the US 
 
Harris (1972) surveyed 1,686 automobile parking structures with a total of 778,000 
parking spaces in the United States and Canada. This study was sponsored by 
American Iron and Steel Institute, which also sponsored the full scale car fire test in a 
real parking structure (Gewain, 1973) as described in section 2.2.3. There were 395 
fires reported during the entire life span of these structures, dating back to 1912 for 
some of the buildings. 
 
According to this study, there was no loss of life or injuries due to fire in the parking 
structures surveyed. A total of 27 fires caused damage to the building, four of which 
resulted in losses of more than $5000 US dollars (USD). The maximum damage 
reported was $50,000 USD. These fires caused a total loss of $130,000 USD on 
approximately $2 billion USD worth of parking buildings. The damage caused by the 




There were 23 fires causing damage of less than $5000 USD. The openness of the 
parking structures was reported for 12 incidents of these fires. Three fires occurred in 
open air parking structures, while nine fires occurred in closed parking structures 
(either above ground or underground). 
 
According to this study, the sprinklers did not contribute to fire control. The report 
finally stated that the risk in parking structures is separate from other types of 
occupancies in terms of determining insurance rate for fire. 
 
2.5.2.2 Denda, (1993) – the US 
 
Denda (1993) studied over 400 fires in parking garages including multi-level 
structures in the US, based on the NFIRS data. 80% of the fire incidents involved 
vehicles. The remainder was caused by malfunction of equipment such as elevators 
and generators etc. and mistake by human error. 
 
There were no fatalities in any of these fires, albeit five fire-fighters and three 
civilians were injured. None of the injuries were directly related with fire. Although 
observances of extensive smoke were reported for 47% of the parking garage fires, 
the breathing apparatus were reported to have prevented injury to the fire-fighters. 
 
It was reported that 7% of the fire incidents involved multiple vehicle fires. Fire 
spreading mainly occurred between two adjacent vehicles, although one incident 
involved three cars simultaneously and another included four cars. 
 
Statistically, this study did not find significant difference between influences of the 
structure openness on the amount of the smoke observed. The extensive smoke was 
observed in 43% of the below-grade or underground structures, and in 46% of the 
aboveground open structures. The report also indicated that the sprinkler system was 




2.5.2.3 Scoones (1995) – Vehicle Repairers in the UK 
 
Scoones (1995) reported 90 serious fires in vehicle repairers, which caused eight 
fatalities and a total loss of £16,341,530 from 1990 to 1994. Nearly half of the total 
losses were from 12 fires, with each loss totalling at least £250,000. The serious fires 




Various statistical studies from the historical literature have been described in this 
section for general vehicle fires and vehicle fires in parking buildings. Some results 
from these studies will be used to compare with those from statistical analysis of New 
Zealand data for vehicle fires in parking buildings, which is the first objective of this 
research. 
 
The studies on general vehicle fires usually involved the subjects of fire frequency, 
fatality, fire cause, fire origin, and age of vehicles involved etc. The studies reviewed 
in this section indicate that arson, electrical faults and fuel leaks are the common 
causes for vehicle fires. 
 
The studies on vehicle fires in parking buildings mainly concentrated in the areas such 
as fire frequency, casualty, fire spread, financial loss, and the effect of sprinklers and 
structure openness on fire. Two US studies on vehicle fires in parking buildings did 
not report any fatality and structure collapse caused by parking building fires 
involving vehicles. Denda (1993) found multiple vehicle fires involving up to four 
vehicles. As highlighted in various car fire tests from the literature, the hazard to life 
safety posed by the smoke generated in vehicle fires in parking buildings was also 
shown by Denda (1993). Both US studies did not consider the sprinkler system as a 
critical factor in the fire safety of parking buildings. Also the statistical studies did not 




2.6 Fire Risk Assessments 
 
Numerous countries have developed comprehensive fire risk evaluation 
methodologies, by which one can take the advantages of performance based building 
code. Bukowski (1993) reviewed the work done in the US, Japan and Australia and 
found remarkable similarities in the different countries’ approach. These methods all 
start with classification of the building, its occupants and quantification of the design 
fires, then move on to predict the spread of smoke/gas, response of occupants, 
intervention to fire and outcome of fire. The article highlighted the need for 
collaboration, which could lead to further improvements and a single composite 
methodology of building fire risk assessment. 
 
Shipp (2002) reviewed the fire risks in road and rail tunnels, in terms of the fire 
frequency and fire severity. This article also discussed both active and passive fire 
prevention measures required to reduce these fire risks in tunnels. 
 
Spearpoint (1997) presented a cost-benefit model for the installation of smoke alarms 
in dwellings in the UK. The analysis defined the reduction in fatalities and injuries by 
smoke alarms as the benefit; the cost was identified as those expenses for installing 
and maintaining domestic smoke alarms. A discount rate of 6% was used in the model 
for a twenty-year period. The analysis considered various scenarios and found that the 
installation of smoke alarms could result in a reduction of 126 deaths and 2,237 
injuries per year in the baseline scenario. 
 
Stephens (1995) described a method of cost-benefit analysis for sprinkler protection. 
The annual loss without sprinklers was obtained from estimated average cost of a 
serious fire divided by the mean time between fires (MTBF). The reduced annual loss 
with sprinklers was determined in a similar manner; fire frequency was assumed to be 
the same for both scenarios in the article. The difference between these two losses and 
insurance premium reduction from the provision of sprinklers was defined as the 
benefit. The cost involved installation and maintenance of sprinkler system and was 




Barry (2002) presented method of developing and evaluating fire loss scenarios by 
event tree analysis and quantifying the fire risks. Ramachandran (1998) has given 
detailed descriptions of cost-benefit analysis for fire protection measures. The 
comprehensive discussions of fire risk assessments can also be found in SFPE 
Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering (DiNenno, 2002), Fire Protection 






Chapter 3 Statistics of Vehicle Fires in New 




3.1.1 New Zealand Fire Service FIRS Statistics 
 
This chapter provides an examination of the fire incidents which involved vehicles 
and occurred in parking buildings throughout New Zealand, during the eight-year 
period from 1995 to 2003. The analysis of these fire incidents was based on the 
vehicle fire statistical data extracted from Fire Incident Reporting System (FIRS) 
database maintained by New Zealand Fire Service. 
 
The statistics are based on the financial year starting from July and ending in June; 
consequently the data analyses in this chapter are also presented in financial year 
instead of calendar year. 
 
There were a total of 26,969 vehicle fires in New Zealand as recorded in FIRS 
database during the eight-year period from 1995 to 2003. These data, in spreadsheet 
form, were filtered to obtain fire incident data for vehicle fires in New Zealand 
parking buildings during this time period. The definitions of vehicle and parking 
building are explained in the following sections. 
 
3.1.2 The Definition of Vehicle 
 
A vehicle in this chapter refers to all vehicle types listed in the following groups under 
the category of Mobile Property Type as in New Zealand Fire Service Fire Incident 




• Passenger, Road, Transport Vehicles 
• Freight, Road, Transport Vehicles 
• Special and Miscellaneous Mobile Property 
 
The vehicle types in the following groups are not included in this research: Rail 
Transport Vehicles; Water Transport Vehicles; Aircraft, Hovercraft; Industrial and 
Agricultural Heavy Equipment; Forest Harvesting Equipment; and Military Mobile 
Property. 
 
3.1.3 The Definition of Parking Building 
 
FIRS database reports two categories of property use: General and Specific Property 
Use. There were some apparent inconsistencies between the General and Specific 
Property Use in the vehicle fire statistical data extracted from FIRS database. It was 
decided to use the Specific Property Use rather than the General Property Use to 
determine if a vehicle fire occurred in a parking building (N. Challands, pers. Comm.). 
It was assumed that the conflicts between the two property uses in the data did not 
affect the analysis substantially. 
 
A parking building is defined with reference to the following codes as specified in the 
group of Mobile Property Storage and Parking, under the category of Specific 
Property Use (New Zealand Fire Service, 1995): 
 
• 8802 – Public carpark: Single level - covered 
• 8803 – Public carpark: Multi-storied above ground 
• 8804 – Public carpark: Multi-storied below ground 
• 8805 – Public carpark: Multi-storied above and below ground 






3.1.4 Others Issues 
 
There were a total of 101 recorded vehicle fires in properties with Specific Property 
Use recorded as covered parking buildings; however 99 of these vehicles fires were 
recorded as mobile property fires instead of structure fires in FIRS database. 
Consequently, the analyses for vehicle fires in parking buildings in this chapter were 
based on the available information from vehicle fires recorded as mobile property 
fires in the FIRS database. This resulted in fewer details for each vehicle fire, 
particularly the details of the parking building involved in fire, the performance of the 
fire protection system (if any) and the impact of the vehicle fire on the building. These 
details would otherwise have been reported in FIRS database, if the vehicle fires had 
been recorded as structure fires. 
 
The FIRS database had been kept modified; as a result some code definitions 
appeared in the FIRS data and cannot be found in the New Zealand Fire Service Fire 
Incident Reporting System Instruction & Coding Manual (New Zealand Fire Service, 
1995). These code definitions were then obtained from an electronic guide for FIRS 
database and communication with New Zealand Fire Service. The electronic guide, in 
Microsoft Access format, was also developed by New Zealand Fire Service and 
included code descriptions for most fields in the FIRS database. 
 
3.1.5 Presentation of the Statistics 
 
In this chapter, the statistical data for vehicle fires in New Zealand parking buildings 
are generally presented in the pie chart form for the eight-year period from 1995 to 
2003. These data are based on the statistics on yearly basis and can be found in 
Appendix A of this report.  
 
Unless noted, the number of vehicle fires quoted in this chapter is the number of 
vehicles involved in fire in parking buildings, as the details of the fire incidents were 
recorded per single vehicle in FIRS database. There were situations where multiple 




3.2 Number of Vehicle Fires in Parking Buildings and 
Casualties 
 
On average, there were 3,371 vehicle fires per year in New Zealand during the eight-
year period from 1995 to 2003. 
 
From 1995 to 2003, the New Zealand Fire Service attended to total of 101 recorded 
vehicle fires in parking buildings, with an average of approximately 12.6 fires per 
year; the breakdown of fire incidents per year is shown in Figure 3-1. 
 
There is no recorded fire fatality in parking buildings in New Zealand, although there 
were approximately two injuries of mainly minor burns each year caused by fires in 

























Year  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 
Number of fire 
incidents 16 18 18 16 13 
Year  2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 Total 
Average 
per year 
Number of fire 
incidents 5 5 10 101 12.6 
 




During this eight-year period, there were a total of eight vehicles involved in three 
multiple vehicle fire incidents and the actual number of fire incidents in parking 
buildings involving vehicles was 96. Therefore, the average fire incidents in New 
Zealand parking buildings, where vehicles were involved, totalled 12 each year. 
Further details of fire spread will be discussed in section 3.5. 
 
3.3 Specific Type of Parking Buildings Involved in Vehicle 
Fires 
 
Figure 3-2 shows the breakdown of all vehicle fires in New Zealand parking buildings 
from 1995 to 2003, according to the building definitions in the group of Mobile 
Property Storage and Parking under Specific Property Use category (New Zealand 
Fire Service, 1995). 
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Figure 3-2: Specific type of parking buildings where vehicles were involved in fires, 1995 – 2003 




The largest group of parking buildings where vehicle fires occurred was Single Level 
Covered Private Fleet Carpark, which accounted for 60% of all vehicle fire incidents 
or 61 incidents. This was also the only group for private parking buildings as defined 
in FIRS database. 
 
Multi-storied above Ground Public Carpark were the second largest group, forming 
13.9% of vehicle fires in parking buildings. This was followed by Single Level 
Covered Public Carpark (11.9%), Multi-storied below Ground Public Carpark (8.9%) 
and Multi-storied above and below Ground Public Carpark (7%). In total, the public 
parking buildings accounted for 40% of all vehicle fire incidents or 40 incidents. 
 
In this statistical analysis, a public parking building was considered as the building 
any member of the public can get access to, while a private parking building was 
regarded as the building where the parking spaces are reserved for those specifically 
entitled to park there. It was supposed that fire-fighters held the similar view when 
entering the data into the FIRS database (N. Challands, pers. Comm.). 
 
3.4 Supposed Causes of Vehicles Fires in Parking Buildings 
 
3.4.1 Statistics in New Zealand 
 
The supposed causes of vehicle fires in New Zealand parking buildings can be divided 
into two broad categories: Deliberately Lit fire and Accidental fire. The latter further 
includes five groups, which are Electrical Faults, Mechanical Failure or Malfunction, 
Carelessness, Unknown and Others. Figure 3-3 demonstrates the details of supposed 





















Figure 3-3: Supposed causes of vehicles fires in parking buildings, 1995 – 2003 (From Table A – 2, 
Appendix A) 
 
The further breakdown of supposed causes of vehicle fires in parking buildings are 
explained below, in accordance with the descriptions under Supposed Cause category 
(New Zealand Fire Service, 1995) 
 
The largest group of Supposed Cause was Deliberately Lit fires, which accounted for 
26.7% of all vehicle fire incidents in parking buildings or 27 fires. This group 
included unlawful (15.8%) and suspicious (10.9%). The difference between unlawful 
and suspicious is the level of confidence in determining wether the fire cause is 
deliberately lit, when the incident data were coded into the FIRS database. 
 
Of 61 vehicle fires in private parking buildings, 15 fires were deliberately lit, of which 
ten incidents were unlawful and five incidents were suspicious. There were therefore 
46 accidental vehicle fires in private parking buildings. 
 
Of 40 vehicle fires in public parking buildings, 12 fires were deliberately lit, of which 
six were unlawful and other six were suspicious. Hence the number of accidental 




The next two groups of Supposed Cause were Electrical Faults (24.8%) and 
Mechanical Failure or Malfunction (16.8%) respectively. The group of Electrical 
Faults involved short circuit and earth fault (19.8%) and other electrical failure (5%). 
The group of Mechanical Failure or Malfunction included part failure, leak or break 
(10.9%); equipment not being operated properly (2%); installed too close to 
combustibles (1%); other installation deficiency (1%); equipment overloaded (1%); 
and lack of maintenance (1%). 
 
The following group was Carelessness. This group involved careless disposal (3%); 
heat source too close to combustibles (3%); combustible placed too close to heat 
source (2%); failure to use ordinary care (2%); reckless act (1%); people playing with 
heat sources (1%) and flammable liquid/gas spilled or accidentally released (1%). 
 
The last two groups of supposed causes were Unknown (11.9%) and Others (6.9%). 
The group of Others included exposure fire (3%); backfire (2%) and friction (2%). 
 
3.4.2 Comparisons with Overseas Findings 
 
As discussed in section 2.5.3, the general statistics from overseas sources indicate that 
arson, electrical faults and fuel leaks are the common causes for vehicle fires. These 
finds are similar to the trend found in the New Zealand statistics in this research, 
where three leading fire causes of vehicle fires in parking buildings were deliberately 
lit, electrical faults and mechanical failure or malfunction. For New Zealand statistics, 
the cause of fuel leak was included in the group of mechanical failure or malfunction 
as shown in section 3.4.1. The comparison of vehicle fire causes between different 
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In 1981, three leading sources of ignition of vehicle fires in the UK ranked by the 
number of incidents were electrical appliances & installations, oiled & petrol fuelled 
appliances and installations, and deliberate/possible deliberate. In 1987, the cause of 
deliberate/possible deliberate became the leading source of ignition, followed by 
electrical appliances & installations and oiled & petrol fuelled appliances and 
installations (Whitaker, 1989). This 1987 figure in the UK appears to be similar to the 
New Zealand statistics in this research. 
 
From 1994 to 1998, the three leading ignition factors of passenger road vehicles in the 
US were part failure, leak or break (18.8%); short circuit or ground fault (18.4%); and 
incendiary or suspicious (17.1%) according to the study by Ahrens (2001). The 
leading cause of highway vehicle fires in 1998 was mechanical or design problems, 
followed by arson and carelessness as the second and third cause respectively (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2001). Again, the leading fire causes in the US 
were similar to those in New Zealand found in this research, although the fire causes 
ranked by the number of incidents were in different order for both countries. It should 





3.5 Vehicles Fires in Parking Buildings by Number of 
Vehicles Involved 
 
3.5.1 Records in New Zealand 
 
The number of vehicles involved in fire was recorded in FIRS database in the form of 
Exposure Number. Every single vehicle fire has an Exposure Number of zero. A 
vehicle fire in the database, having an Exposure Number of one or greater, indicated 
that the fire was the result of exposure to an initial fire. However FIRS database did 
not indicate if the involvement of more vehicles contributed to the increase of heat 
release rate or those vehicles, recorded as involved in fire as a result of the fire spread, 
only received the minor damage from the vehicle first catching fire. 
 
Figure 3-4 illustrates the vehicle fires in New Zealand parking buildings by number of 















































Fires by Number of Vehicles Involved 
 
Figure 3-4: Vehicles fires in parking buildings by number of vehicles involved, 1995 – 2003 (From 




There were a total of eight vehicles involved in three multiple vehicle fire incidents 
during eight-year period from 1995 to 2003 and these fires all occurred in private 
parking buildings. During this period, there were a total of 101 vehicle fires in parking 
buildings; therefore the actual number of fire incidents in parking buildings involving 
vehicles was 96, which included 93 single vehicle fire incidents and three multiple 
vehicle fire incidents. 
 
There were two incidents where two vehicles were involved in the parking building 
fire simultaneously; these two incidents occurred in the year of 1995/1996 and 
2002/2003 respectively. One incident was caused by a deliberately lit fire, while the 
fire cause for another incident was accidental. 
 
One other recorded incident involved four vehicles in the year of 1999/2000; this fire 
started from a vehicle with recorded type as light truck (under one tonne, ute, van, and 
wagon) then spread to three buses. The fire cause for this incident was accidental. 
 
In summary, for eight vehicle fires where multiple vehicles were involved, two fires 
were deliberately lit and six fires were accidental. As found in section 3.4.1, there 
were 15 deliberately lit fires and 46 accidental fires in private parking buildings. Thus 
there were 13 deliberately lit non-spreading fires and 40 accidental non-spreading 
fires in New Zealand private parking buildings. There was no vehicle fire spread 
incident in New Zealand public parking buildings. These figures were used to 
determine the relevant probabilities in event trees which will be presented in  
Chapter 4. 
 
3.5.2 Comparison with the US Study by Denda (1993) 
 
There were three multiple vehicle fire incidents from a total of 96 fire incidents in 
New Zealand parking buildings, from 1995 to 2003. This means that approximately 
3% of the vehicle fire incidents in New Zealand parking buildings involved multiple 
vehicles. This figure was lower than the 7% value quoted by Denda (1993) in a US 




The same study by Denda (1993) found that most multiple vehicle fire incidents in the 
US parking structures involved two adjacent vehicles, with one case involving three 
cars and another involving four cars. The number of vehicles involved was similar in 
New Zealand parking building fires where two incidents involved two vehicles and 
one incident involved four vehicles. 
 
3.6 Type of Vehicles Involved in the Parking Building Fires 
 
Figure 3-5 illustrates the breakdown of type of vehicles involved in fire incidents in 
New Zealand parking buildings from 1995 to 2003. 
 













Figure 3-5: Type of vehicles involved in fires in parking buildings, 1995 – 2003 (From Table A – 4, 
Appendix A) 
 
The further breakdown of the vehicle types are described as follows, according to 
descriptions under the category of Mobile Property Types (New Zealand Fire Service, 
1995). The biggest group of vehicle types was Car, Taxi and Ambulance which 
account for 56.4% of all fires or 57 vehicle fires. This was followed by the group of 
Unknown (22.8%), Other Vehicles (14.9%) and Bus (5.9%). The group of Other 
Vehicles included truck of one tonne and over and fire appliance (9.9%); light truck 
under one tonne, ute, van and wagon (4%); and waste container, bin, compacter and 
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dumper (1%) as described under Mobile Property Type category (New Zealand Fire 
Service, 1995). 
 
3.7 Age of Vehicles Involved in Parking Building Fires 
 
3.7.1 Figures in New Zealand 
 
The FIRS database reports the year of vehicle fire incident and manufacture year of 
the vehicle involved. The manufacture year was recorded for 52 vehicle fires out of a 
total of 101 vehicle fires in parking buildings from 1995 to 2003. The ages of these 
vehicles were therefore obtained by subtracting the year of manufacture from the year 
of fire incident. 
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Figure 3-6: Distribution comparison between age of vehicles involved in parking building fires 
and age of all registered vehicles (From Table A – 5, Appendix A) 
 
Figure 3-6 shows the distribution of recorded age of vehicles involved in New 
Zealand parking building fires from 1995 to 2003. For comparison, the age 
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distribution for all registered vehicles in New Zealand as at 1st January 1998 (Tipping, 
1998) is also illustrated in the same figure. It was assumed that the distribution of 
vehicle age for national fleet in 1998 can represent the trend in New Zealand in the 
eight-year period considered in this research. The correlation coefficient between two 
data sets of vehicle age was found to be 0.83. 
 
The average recorded age of vehicles involved in New Zealand parking building fires 
was found to be 14.3 years old. The mean age for major vehicle types in New Zealand 
during five-calendar-year period from 1998 to 2002 (New Zealand Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles, 2003) can be found in Table A – 6, Appendix A. The average vehicle age in 
this five-year period was calculated as 14.2 years old and is very close to the average 
age of those vehicles involved in the parking building fires. 
 
3.7.2 Comparisons with the Overseas Studies 
 
Figure 3-6 shows that the vehicles of 11-15 years old were the largest group involved 
in parking building fire. Moore (1992) found that the largest percentage of vehicle 
fires in UK happened in vehicles of eight years old, which is less than the figure in 
New Zealand. This difference can possibly be due to the fact that the vehicle ages in 
New Zealand, with an average age of 14.2 years old, were generally older than UK. 
 
Figure 3-6 indicates a correlation between the age of vehicle and probability of 
vehicle involved in fire. The percentage of vehicles involved in fires with ages less 
than 11 years old was lower than the percentage of vehicles in the same age group 
from national fleet; conversely, the percentage of vehicles involved in fire with ages 
equal to or more than 11 years old was higher than the percentage of vehicles in the 
same age group from national fleet. In conclusion, the probability of a vehicle 
involved in parking building fire rises with the increase of the vehicle age. 
 
A 1973 national survey of motor vehicle fires in the United States (Trisko, 1975) 
found the similar trend and indicated that a vehicle of ten years old or more was four 
times more likely to be involved in fire than a vehicle less than three years old. In 
New Zealand from 1995 to 2003, a vehicle equal to or more than 11 years old was 
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approximately two and half times more likely to be involved in parking building fires 
than a vehicle less than three years old. This value of 2.5 was obtained by dividing the 
percentage ratio for vehicles equal to or more than 11 years old by the percentage 
ratio for vehicles less than three years old; the percentage ratio for each age group was 
the ratio between the percentage of vehicles involved in fire and the percentage of 
vehicles from national fleet. 
 
3.8 Vehicle Fires in Parking Buildings by Day and Time 
 
Figure 3-7 illustrates the number of vehicle fires in New Zealand parking buildings by 
day of week, for eight-year period from 1995 to 2003. The number of fires was also 
broken down to private and public parking buildings, the definitions of which can be 
found in section 3.3. 
 















































































































Figure 3-7: Vehicle fires in parking buildings by day of week, 1995 – 2003 (From Table A – 7, 
Appendix A) 
 
It can be seen that Friday was the peak day of the week for total parking buildings as 
well as both private and public parking buildings. The fewest fires occurred on 
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Monday for total parking buildings and private parking buildings, while Wednesday 
was the day with the fewest vehicle fires in public parking building. It can also be 
seen that the vehicle fire frequencies in private parking buildings were generally 
higher than those in public parking buildings; however Sunday was the only day when 
the number of vehicle fires in public parking buildings exceeded that in private 
parking buildings. 
 
Figure 3-8 demonstrates the number of vehicle fires in New Zealand parking 
buildings by time of day, for eight-year period from 1995 to 2003. The number of 
fires was also broken down to private and public parking buildings. 
 





























































































































































































Figure 3-8: Vehicle fires in parking buildings by time of day, 1995 – 2003 (From Table A – 8, 
Appendix A) 
 
The occurrences of vehicle fires in parking buildings appear to be related to the time 
of vehicle use. The low fire frequency occurred between 00:00 and 7:00 with a small 
increase from 7:00 to 10:00. No vehicle fires happened in parking building during 
02:00 to 03:00 period. There was a slight drop of fire frequency between 10:00 and 
11:00. The fire frequency then increased steadily as the time progressed, reaching 
peak between 13:00 and 14:00. From this point, fire frequency gradually decreased 
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until the hour between 18:00 and 19:00. The fire frequency showed a sudden increase 
between 19:00 and 20:00, and then declined steadily during the 20:00 to 00:00 period. 
 
During the time period from 12:00 to 13:00, the vehicle fire frequency in private 
parking buildings was lower than that in public parking buildings. There was also no 
vehicle fire in private parking buildings between 17:00 and 18:00. This can perhaps 
be explained by the possible high usage of the public parking buildings by motorists 
during this time period. For the rest of time during the day, the vehicle fire frequency 
in private parking buildings was generally higher than that in public parking buildings. 
 
3.9 Heat Sources Involved in Vehicle Fires in Parking 
Buildings 
 
The heat sources of vehicle fires in parking buildings can be divided into the 
following six groups: Short Circuit Arc; Match, Lighter & Cigarettes; Exposure Fire; 
Hot Object; Flame; and Not Recorded. Figure 3-9 shows the above groups of heat 



















Figure 3-9: Heat sources involved in vehicles fires in parking buildings, 1995 – 2003 (From Table 




The further breakdown of the heat sources of vehicle fires in parking buildings are 
described below, according to the descriptions under the Heat Source category (New 
Zealand Fire Service, 1995). 
 
Short Circuit Arc, accounting for 32.7% or 33 vehicle fires, was the leading group of 
heat sources involved in vehicles fires in parking buildings from 1995 to 2003. This 
group contained short circuit arc from unspecified causes (18.8%); mechanical 
damage (10.9%); defective or worn installation (2%); and water cause (1%). 
 
The second largest group of heat sources was Match, Lighter & Cigarettes (20.8%), 
which can be further broken down to match (13.9%); flame type lighter (3%); 
possible combination of lighter, match and candle (2%); and cigarette (2%). 
 
The first two groups of heat sources for vehicle fires in New Zealand parking 
buildings, ranked by number of fires, involved Short Circuit Arc; Match, Lighter & 
Cigarettes as discussed above. These two heat sources seem to agree with the first two 
fire causes of vehicle fires in New Zealand parking buildings, which were 
Deliberately Lit and Electrical Faults as shown in section 3.4, although in different 
order. 
 
The third group of heat sources was Exposure Fire (19.8%), which involved unable to 
classify (14.9%); radiated heat (4%); and conducted heat (1%). 
 
Hot Object was the fourth group of heat sources (16.8%), which included heat from 
liquid fuelled equipment (5.9%); improperly operating electrical equipment (3%); 
smoking material (3%); friction heat and overheated tyres (2%); not classified above 
(2%); and properly operating electrical equipment (1%). 
 
The last two groups of heat sources involved were Flame (6.9%) and Not Recorded 
(3%). The group of flame involved flame escaping from liquid fuelled equipment and 
backfire (3%); coal or coke fuelled equipment (1%); gas or liquid powered cutting 
torch (1%); flame from gas equipment other than a torch (1%); and unclassified 




3.10 Object First Ignited in Vehicle Fires in Parking Buildings 
 
The objects first ignited in vehicle fires in parking buildings can be divided into the 
following six groups: Unknown; Electrical Components; Flammable Liquid and 
Gases (not aerosols or propellants); Others; Upholstery and Soft Goods; and Structure 
Components. Figure 3-10 illustrates these six groups of objects first ignited, for 
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Figure 3-10: Object first ignited in vehicles fires in parking buildings, 1995 – 2003 (From Table A 
– 10, Appendix A) 
 
The further analysis of objects first ignited in vehicle fires in parking buildings is 
explained below, in accordance with the descriptions under the category of Object 
Ignited (New Zealand Fire Service, 1995). 
 
Unknown accounted for 26.7% or 27 fire incidents and was the largest group of object 
first ignited in vehicle fires in parking buildings from 1995 to 2003. 
 
The next largest group of object first ignited were Electrical Components (25.7%), 
which can be further broken down to electrical wire and wiring insulation (22.8%); 
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power transfer and electrical equipment - not classified above (2%); and electronic 
componentry (1%). 
 
The Flammable Liquid and Gases (not aerosols or propellants) group accounted for 
14.9% of vehicle fires in parking buildings. This was followed by Others group, 
which can be further broken down to multiple items (5%); rubbish, garbage and waste 
(2%); luggage (1%); newspaper, magazine and files (1%); paper excluding newspaper 
or rolled paper (1%); tarpaulin, Tent, Marquee (1%); pyrotechnics, explosives and 
fireworks (1%); propellant, aerosol and hairspray (1%); and tyre (1%). 
 
The Upholstery and Soft Goods group formed 10.9% and involved upholstered chairs, 
sofas, beds and vehicle seats (5%); clothing not being worn (2%); non made up goods 
including fabrics and yarn (2%); un-upholstered chairs, sofas, beds and vehicle seats 
(1%); and bedding (1%). 
 
The Structure Components group accounted for 7.9% and included thermal insulation 
(4%); floor coverings (1%); framing, structural member, interior walls and doors (1%); 
lagging (1%); and awning and canopy (1%). 
 
3.11 Material First Ignited in Vehicle Fires in Parking Buildings 
 
The material first ignited in vehicle fires in parking buildings can be separated into the 
following five groups: Unknown; PVC: Floor Tiles, Guttering, Pipes, Plastic Bags, 
Electrical Insulation; Upholstery and Soft Goods; Flammable Liquid; and Others. 
Figure 3-11 demonstrates the above groups, for vehicle fires in New Zealand parking 






















Figure 3-11: Material first ignited in vehicles fires in parking buildings, 1995 – 2003 (From Table 
A – 11, Appendix A) 
 
The further breakdown of the material first ignited in vehicle fires in parking 
buildings are described below, according to the descriptions under the category of 
Type of Material Object Made of (New Zealand Fire Service, 1995). 
 
Unknown was the largest group of material first ignited and accounted for 27.7% of 
all vehicle fires in parking buildings or 28 fire incidents from 1995 to 2003. 
 
The next largest group of material first ignited was PVC (26.7%) including floor tiles, 
guttering, pipes, plastic bags and electrical insulation. 
 
The Upholstery and Soft Goods group accounted for 15.8% of all fires and contained 
vinyl (4%); fabric and finished fibre (4%); polyurethane (3%); cotton, canvas and 
rayon (3%) and wool and wool mixtures (2%). 
 
The Flammable Liquid group accounted for 14.9% of all fires and involved petrol 




The Others group formed 14.9% of all fires and included multiple materials first 
ignited (5%); rubbish (3%); rubber (2%); wood (1%); plywood (1%); treated paper 





Chapter 4 Event Tree Analysis of Vehicle Fires in 
the Parking Building 
 
4.1 Introduction to Event Tree Analysis 
 
Event tree analysis is used in this chapter to analyse the vehicle fires in New Zealand 
parking buildings. Event tree analysis is primarily a quantitative risk assessment tool, 
which provides a graphical logic model for proposing an initiating event and 
evaluating the potential outcomes. 
 
An event tree structure is organized by sequential events; each event generally results 
in two or more consequences, which are added to the tree as separate branches. The 
event tree can be used to identify possible outcomes following an initiating event and 
quantify these outcomes by assigning probabilities to each branch. The probabilities 
of all the branches caused by an event must add to one. The resulting probability for 
each outcome can therefore be obtained by multiplying the probabilities along the 
branches and displayed at the end of the branch. 
 
The event tree model for vehicle fires in parking buildings in this chapter is developed 
to the following procedures: 
 
• Identifying the initiating event 
• Identifying the pathways to be assessed within the event tree framework; 
pathways are defined as those events that follow the initiating event in 
succession (Barry, 2002) 
• Constructing the event tree branch logic 
• Assigning probabilities to the initiating event and the branch of subsequent 




All the event trees for this research were built using Microsoft Excel programme 
(Microsoft, 2003). 
 
4.2 Event Tree for Vehicle Fires in the Parking Building 
 
4.2.1 Annual Vehicle Fire Frequency per Number of Vehicle 
Registered 
 
As shown in section 3.2, an average of 3,371 vehicle fires occurred each year in New 
Zealand for eight-year period from 1995 to 2003. On average, there were 
approximately 2,636,579 vehicles registered each year based on the statistics in seven 
calendar years from 1996 to 2002, which can be found in Table B – 1 (New Zealand 
Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2003), Appendix B. Thus the annual frequency of a 
single vehicle involved in fire in New Zealand can be obtained as: 
 
 3,371 / 2,636,579 = 1.28 × 10-3 year-1 
 
4.2.2 Identifying the Initiating Event and Pathways 
 
The initiating event in this event tree is the ignition of a vehicle. This vehicle fire may 
happen either inside a parking building or somewhere else. There are no subsequent 
branches for those vehicle fires not occurring in a parking building, as this research is 
mainly concentrated on those vehicle fires in the parking building. 
 
The parking building where a vehicle fire occurs can be either public or private type 
building. As discussed in section 3.3, a public parking building is for parking of 
vehicles by any member of the public and might include parking structures owned by 
local councils or private parking operators, covered parking belonging to shopping 
malls or supermarkets, etc. A private parking building is for those people who are 
authorised to use it and may include parking inside multi-stories office or apartment 




Two types of the fire causes for vehicle fires in parking buildings are considered in 
the event tree model, one of which is deliberately lit fire as discussed in section 3.4.1. 
Another cause is accidental fire, which included all the fires not caused by deliberate 
or arson behaviour. Following the ignition, the fire may be confined to the vehicle 
first ignited or spread to one or more adjacent parked vehicles.  
 
The pathways concerning the vehicle fires in parking buildings are therefore identified 
as follows: 
 
• Fire location – in the parking building or somewhere else 
• Building Type – private or public 
• Fire Cause – deliberate or accidental 
• Fire Spread – contained in one vehicle or spread to others 
• Number of Vehicles Involved – one, two or more than three vehicles 
 
4.2.3 Constructing the Event Tree 
 
The constructed event tree can be seen in Figure 4-1. The annual frequency of a single 
vehicle involved in fire in New Zealand is 1.28 × 10-3 year-1 as found in section 4.2.1 
and used as the frequency for the initiating event in this event tree. 
 
There were a total of 13 branches at the end of the event tree. The resulting 
probability for each branch is the annual frequency of a single vehicle involved in a 
parking building fire, for each scenario (as defined by each branch). The value of 
these probabilities can be found at the end of the event tree. 
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Figure 4-1: Event tree for vehicle fires in the parking building 
 
4.2.4 Determining Probabilities 
 
The relevant probabilities for all the pathways in event tree shown in Figure 4-1 are 
determined in this section. These probabilities are based on the results from the 





Table 4-1 lists the relevant numbers of vehicles involved in parking building fires, 
from which the probabilities for each pathway in the event tree can be calculated. 
 
Table 4-1: Number of vehicles involved in parking building fires for each pathway in event tree 
Number of Vehicles Involved 












2 (spread) - 2 0 15 (deliberate) 
13 (no spread) 13 - - 
6 (spread) - 2 4 
61 (private) 
46 (accidental) 
40 (no spread) 40 - - 
0 (spread) - 0 0 12 (deliberate) 
12 (no spread) 12 - - 
0 (spread) - 0 0 
40 (public) 
28 (accidental) 
28 (no spread) 28 - - 
 
Table 4-1 shows two incidents each involving two vehicles in the parking building 
fire at the same time and one incident involving four vehicles simultaneously. 
 
4.2.4.1 Fire Location 
 
The average number of vehicles involved in parking building fires each year was 12.6, 
for eight-year period from 1995 to 2003 as mentioned in section 3.2. Hence the 
probability of a single vehicle involved in parking building fire each year can be 
calculated as: 
 
 12.6 / 3,371 = 0.37% 
 
The probability of a single vehicle involved in fire per year, not occurring in a parking 
building, is therefore: 
 




4.2.4.2 Building Type 
 
Table 4-1 shows the numbers of vehicles involved in private and public parking 
building fires as 61 and 40 respectively. Effectively, the probabilities for the branches 
of Private and Public in the pathway of Building Type are 60% and 40% respectively. 
 
4.2.4.3 Fire Causes in Private Parking Buildings 
 
As shown in Table 4-1, there were 15 deliberately lit fires out of 61 vehicle fires in 
private parking buildings. Thus for private parking buildings, the probability of the 
branch of Deliberate in the pathway of Fire Cause is: 
 
 15 / 61 = 25% 
 
Hence, the probability of the branch of Accidental for private parking buildings in the 
same pathway is 75%. 
 
4.2.4.4 Fire Causes in Public Parking Buildings 
 
There were also 12 deliberately lit fires out of 40 vehicle fires in public parking 
buildings. Hence for public parking buildings, the probability for the branch of 
Deliberate in the pathway of Fire Cause is: 
 
 12 / 40 = 30% 
 
The probability for the branch of Accidental for public parking buildings in the 




4.2.4.5 Fire Spread and Number of Vehicles Involved – Deliberate 
Fires in Private Parking Buildings 
 
For deliberately lit fire, Table 4-1 shows two vehicles involved in the multiple vehicle 
fire in private parking buildings. These two vehicles actually were involved in fire at 
the same time in one incident. There were 15 deliberate fires in private parking 
buildings, hence the probability for the branch of Spread in the pathway of Fire 
Spread is: 
 
 2 / 15 = 13% 
 
The probability for the branch of No Spread in the pathway of Fire Spread is therefore 
87%. 
 
Since there was no incident where more than three vehicles were involved for this 
situation, the probability for the branch of Three or More (vehicles involved in fire) in 
the pathway of Number of Vehicles Involved is 0%. The probability for the branch of 
Two (vehicles involved in fire) in the pathway of Number of Vehicles Involved is 
100%.  
 
4.2.4.6 Fire Spread and Number of Vehicles Involved – Accidental 
Fires in Private Parking Buildings 
 
For accidental fire, Table 4-1 shows six vehicles involved in the multiple vehicle fires 
in private parking buildings. There were 46 accidental fires in private parking 
buildings, thus the probability for the branch of Spread in the pathway of Fire Spread 
is: 
 
 6 / 46 = 13 % 
 





From Table 4-1, there was one incident where two vehicles were involved 
simultaneously and another incident where four vehicles were involved concurrently. 
Hence the probability for the branch of Three or More (vehicles involved in fire) in 
the pathway of Number of Vehicles Involved can be obtained as: 
 
 4 / 6 = 67 % 
 
The probability for the branch of Two (vehicles involved in fire) in the pathway of 
Number of Vehicles Involved is therefore 33%. 
 
4.2.4.7 Fire Spread and Number of Vehicles Involved in Public 
Parking Buildings 
 
Table 4-1 indicates that there were no recorded multiple vehicle fires in public 
parking buildings. The probability for the branch of Spread in the pathway of Fire 
Spread in public parking buildings is 0%, for both deliberate and accidental fire 
causes. The probability for the branch of No Spread in the pathway of Fire Spread is 
therefore 100% for both fire causes in public buildings. 
 
In Figure 4-1, the pathway for Number of Vehicles Involved is still constructed for 










4.3 Event Tree for Vehicle Fires in Non-Sprinklered Parking 
Building 
 
4.3.1 Vehicle Fire Frequency per Vehicle Visit 
 
4.3.1.1 The Definition 
 
The fire frequency for each branch of event tree in Figure 4-1 was based on the total 
number of vehicles involved in parking building fires and registered vehicles in New 
Zealand. It indicates the annual frequency of one vehicle involved in fire in the 
parking building for the scenario defined by each branch in the event tree. 
 
For the purpose of fire risk assessment of vehicle fires in parking building, one would 
relate the fire frequency to the number of the actual fire incidents instead of the 
number of vehicles involved in fire. This consideration can include the effect of 
possible fire spread between vehicles and consequently more severe building damage 
than the single vehicle fire. The primary purpose of the parking building is for the 
temporary storage of vehicles. So the number of vehicle visit to the parking building 
would significantly affect the fire frequency, based on the assumption that the ignition 
probability by each vehicle visiting the parking building is the same. Chandler and 
Shipp (1995) also suggested that the occurrence of a vehicle fire is not time related if 
the vehicle engine has been on or off for more than 20 minutes (see section 2.5.1.1). It 
is therefore appropriate to also relate the fire frequency to the number of vehicle visit 
to the parking building. 
 
An event tree is therefore introduced later in this chapter for a non-sprinklered parking 
building, with fire frequency based on the total number of fire incidents and vehicle 




4.3.1.2 Estimation of the Number of Total Parking Spaces in New 
Zealand Parking Buildings 
 
A survey on members of the New Zealand Parking Association was carried out for 
this research to obtain the fire safety record and the total number of the parking 
buildings in New Zealand. The results were not complete due to the inadequate 
responses. A summary of results for number of parking buildings in New Zealand can 
be found in Table B – 2, Appendix B. 
 
As part of this survey, the total number of parking spaces in two New Zealand cities 
was also investigated. Table 4-2 shows the number of parking spaces in parking 
buildings in Auckland city (J. Cotter, pers. Comm.) and Christchurch city 
(Christchurch City Council, 2003) in New Zealand. 
 
Table 4-2: Number of parking spaces in parking buildings and registered vehicles in Auckland 
and Christchurch, New Zealand 
















Auckland 5000 12,910 24,670 3,170 45,750 725,000 
Christchurch - - - - 27,000 352,068 
 
For figures of parking spaces for Auckland city in Table 4-2, the parking spaces in 
private non residential parking buildings included those in shopping malls, 
supermarkets, and office buildings etc. The total number of registered vehicles in 
Auckland was for the year of 2003 (Auckland Regional Council, 2003). 
 
The figure of parking spaces for Christchurch city shown in Table 4-2 was for all the 
off street bays in central Christchurch and was assumed being representative of the 
total parking spaces in parking buildings of whole Christchurch city. The total number 





The number of parking spaces in parking buildings and registered vehicles for both 
cities were then used to predict the total number of parking spaces in New Zealand, 
based on the number of vehicles registered in New Zealand. As shown in Table B – 1 
(New Zealand Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2003) in Appendix B, there were a total 
of 2,841,301 vehicles registered in New Zealand in 2002. The total number of parking 
spaces in New Zealand parking buildings was thus estimated as: 
 
 From Auckland figure (2,841,301 / 725,000) × 45,750 = 179,296 
 From Christchurch figure (2,841,301 / 352,068) × 27,000 = 217,899 
 
The results derived from the number of parking spaces and registered vehicles for 
both cities were reasonably close. The average value from both results was 
approximately 200,000 spaces and used for the determination of vehicle fire 
frequency in parking buildings in New Zealand. 
 
4.3.1.3 Annual Usage Ratio of a Parking Building 
 
For the purpose of fire risk assessment of vehicle fires in the parking building, the 
concept of annual usage ratio is proposed in this research. It is defined as annual 
vehicle visits to a particular parking building divided by total number of parking 
spaces in this parking building. This represents the annual vehicle turnover rate in a 
particular parking building; the annual usage ratio also expresses the annual average 
number of vehicle visits to one parking space in the building. The parking building 
operators in New Zealand generally keep the yearly record of total vehicle visits into 
their parking buildings. 
 
The number of car parking visits to Christchurch City Council’s parking buildings 
was 1,115,000 a year in 2003 (Christchurch City Council, 2003). The number of the 
parking bays in these buildings was 3,164 (K. Scott, pers. Comm.), therefore the 
average annual usage ratio or turnover ratio is: 
 




4.3.1.4 Estimation of Total Vehicle Visits to New Zealand Parking 
Buildings and Fire Frequency 
 
Based on the estimation of 200,000 parking spaces in New Zealand parking buildings, 
the total annual vehicle visits to New Zealand parking buildings can be obtained as: 
 
 200,000 (spaces) × 350 visit/year = 70,000,000 visit/year or visit year-1 
 
As presented in section 3.2, the actual number of fire incidents involving vehicles in 
New Zealand parking buildings from 1995 to 2003 was 96. The average number of 
fire incidents in New Zealand parking buildings where vehicles were involved was 12 
each year. The frequency of vehicle fires in the parking building for each vehicle visit 
is thus: 
 
 12 year-1 / 70,000,000 visit year-1 = 1.71 × 10-7 visit-1 
 
4.3.2 Identifying the Initiating Event and Pathways 
 
The initiating event in this event tree is the ignition of a vehicle fire in the non-
sprinklered parking building. The pathways for the vehicle fires in the non-sprinklered 
parking buildings are identified as follows: 
 
• Building Type – private or public 
• Fire Cause – deliberate or accidental 
• Fire Spread – contained in one vehicle or spread to others 
• Number of Vehicles Involved – one, two or more than three vehicles 
 




4.3.3 Constructing the Event Tree – Non-Sprinklered Parking 
Building 
 
The vehicle fire frequency of 1.71 × 10-7 visit-1, as found in section 4.3.1.4, was used 
for the initiating event in the event tree for vehicle fires in a non-sprinklered parking 

















Vehicle No Spread One
Fire 95% 100% 7.14E-08
Frequency #REF!
in the Three or More
Parking 0% 0
Building Spread #REF!
Per Visit 0% Two





























There were a total of 12 branches at the end of this event tree. The consequential 
probability is the vehicle fire frequency per each vehicle visit in any non-sprinklered 
parking building, for each scenario as defined by each branch. These frequencies are 
shown at the end of the event tree. 
 
The details of relevant probabilities for all pathways in this event tree are described in 
section 4.3.4. 
 
4.3.4 Determining Probabilities 
 
The relevant probabilities for all pathways in the event tree as shown in Figure 4-2 are 
determined in this section. Table 4-3 listed the actual number of vehicle fire incidents 
in New Zealand parking buildings for each pathway, from which the relevant 
probabilities in the event tree can be calculated. These fire occurrences were obtained 
from Table 4-1 by considering those vehicle fires where multiple vehicles were 
involved in one incident. It should be noted that the fire occurrences in public 
buildings match those in Table 4-1 because fire spreads only occurred in the private 
buildings. 
 
Table 4-3: Number of vehicle fire incidents in parking buildings for each pathway in event tree  
Number of Vehicles Involved 












1 (spread) - 1 0 14 (deliberate) 
13 (no spread) 13 - - 
2 (spread) - 1 1 
56 (private) 
42 (accidental) 
40 (no spread) 40 - - 
0 (spread) - 0 0 12 (deliberate) 
12 (no spread) 12 - - 
0 (spread) - 0 0 
40 (public) 
28 (accidental) 




The data in Table 4-3 were based on New Zealand Fire Service FIRS statistics. The 
performance of the fire protection system such as sprinklers was not available in the 
statistical data as discussed in section 3.1.4. It was assumed that the effect of 
sprinklers on the fire occurrences in Table 4-3 can be ignored. Hence the derived 
probabilities in the event tree in Figure 4-2 are considered for the situation of non-
sprinklered parking building. 
 
4.3.4.1 Building Type 
 
Table 4-3 shows the vehicle fire occurrences in private buildings as 56; the probability 
for the branch of Private in the pathway of Building Type is therefore: 
 
 56 / 96 = 58% 
 
The probability for the branch of Public in the pathway of Building Type is hence 
42%. 
 
4.3.4.2 Fire Causes in Private Parking Buildings 
 
Table 4-3 shows 14 deliberately lit fires out of 56 vehicle fires in private parking 
buildings. Hence for private parking buildings, the probability of the branch of 
Deliberate in the pathway of Fire Cause is: 
 
 14 / 56 = 25% 
 
The probability of the branch of Accidental for private parking buildings in the same 






4.3.4.3 Fire Causes in Public Parking Buildings 
 
As obtained in section 4.2.4.4, the probability for the branches of Deliberate and 
Accidental for public parking buildings in the pathway of Fire Cause is 30% and 70% 
respectively. 
 
4.3.4.4 Fire Spread and Number of Vehicles Involved – Deliberate 
Fires in Private Parking Buildings 
 
There was only one deliberately lit incident involving two vehicles in private parking 
buildings as shown in Table 4-3. There were 14 deliberate fire incidents in private 
parking buildings, hence the probability for the branch of Spread in the pathway of 
Fire Spread is: 
 
 1 / 14 = 7% 
 
The probability for the branch of No Spread in the pathway of Fire Spread is therefore 
93%. 
 
The probability for the branch of Three or More (vehicles involved in fire) in the 
pathway of Number of Vehicles Involved is 0%, as there was no incident where more 
than three vehicles were involved for this situation. The probability for the branch of 
Two (vehicles involved in fire) in the pathway of Number of Vehicles Involved is 
then 100%. 
 
4.3.4.5 Fire Spread and Number of Vehicles Involved – Accidental 
Fires in Private Parking Buildings 
 
There were two accidental fire incidents involving multiple vehicles in private parking 
buildings as shown in Table 4-3. There were 42 deliberate fire incidents in private 
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parking buildings, hence the probability for the branch of Spread in the pathway of 
Fire Spread is: 
 
 2 / 42 = 5% 
 
The probability for the branch of No Spread in the pathway of Fire Spread is therefore: 
95%. 
 
Table 4-3 shows one incident where two vehicles were involved simultaneously and 
another incident where four vehicles were involved at the same time. Hence the 
probability for the branch of Three or More (vehicles involved in fire) in the pathway 
of Number of Vehicles Involved can be obtained as: 
 
 1 / 2 = 50% 
 
The probability for the branch of Two (vehicles involved in fire) in the pathway of 
Number of Vehicles Involved is therefore 50%. 
 
4.3.4.6 Fire Spread and Number of Vehicles Involved in Public 
Parking Buildings 
 
As obtained in section 4.2.4.7, the probability for the branch of Spread in the pathway 
of Fire Spread in public parking buildings is 0%, for both deliberate and accidental 
fire causes. The probability for the branch of No Spread in the pathway of Fire Spread 
is therefore 100% for both fire causes in public buildings. 
 
In Figure 4-2, the pathway for Number of Vehicles Involved is still constructed for 




4.4 Event Tree for Vehicle Fires in Sprinklered Parking 
Building 
 
Generally, the operation of sprinklers can cool the environment, control the fire 
spread, thus protecting the building. For the situation in a parking structure, the 
various Australian fire tests reviewed in section 2.2.4 (BHP, 1987; Bennetts et al., 
1990) showed that sprinkler operations can confine the fire within the test car, 
therefore preventing the vehicle fire from further development in the structure. This 
was also suggested by Schleich et al. (1999) as discussed in section 2.1.3.  
 
Based on the above discussion, the event tree model in this research assumes that the 
activation of the sprinkler system in the event of a vehicle fire can constrain the fire 
within the originally ignited vehicle and protect the building from the fire damage. 
Effectively this means that there will be no vehicle fire spread in a sprinklered parking 
building. 
 
The event tree for vehicle fires in sprinklered parking building was constructed from 
the event tree shown in Figure 4-2 for non-sprinklered parking building. The only 
difference is the probabilities in the pathway of Fire Spread. 
 
Marryatt et al. (1988) found that the success rate of automatic sprinkler systems was 
more than 99% during 100-year period from 1886 to 1986 in Australia and New 
Zealand. The sprinkler system success probability was therefore assumed to be 100%. 
Based on this assumption, the probability for each branch of Spread in the pathway of 
Fire Spread is 0%. The probability for each branch of No Spread in the same pathway 
is therefore 100%. The constructed event tree for vehicle fires in a sprinklered parking 


















Vehicle No Spread One
Fire 100% 100% 7.50E-08
Frequency
in the Three or More
Parking 0% 0
Building Spread
Per Visit 0% Two




























Figure 4-3: Event tree for vehicle fire incidents in sprinklered parking building 
 
4.5 Summary of Vehicle Fire Frequencies in Parking 
Buildings 
 
The vehicle fire frequency per vehicle visit for each branch in event trees was 




Table 4-4: Summary of the vehicle fire frequency per visit for each branch of event trees – non-
sprinklered and sprinklered parking buildings 
Non-Sprinklered 







Three or More 0 Spread Two 1.79 × 10-9 Deliberate 
No Spread One 2.32 × 10-8 
Three or More 1.79 × 10-9 Spread Two 1.79 × 10-9 
Private 
Accidental 
No Spread One 7.14 × 10-8 
Three or More 0 Spread Two 0 Deliberate 
No Spread One 2.14 × 10-8 
Three or More 0 Spread Two 0 
Public 
Accidental 
No Spread One 5.00 × 10-8 
Sprinklered 







Three or More 0 Spread Two 0 Deliberate 
No Spread One 2.50 × 10-8 
Three or More 0 Spread Two 0 
Private 
Accidental 
No Spread One 7.50 × 10-8 
Three or More 0 Spread Two 0 Deliberate 
No Spread One 2.14 × 10-8 
Three or More 0 Spread Two 0 
Public 
Accidental 







4.6 Comparison of Annual Fire Frequencies between General 
and Parking Buildings 
 
4.6.1 Fire Frequencies in General Buildings 
 
Fire frequency in a building can be expressed by the following equation, based on a 
study by Ramachandran (1988): 
 
F = K × Aα Equation 4-1 
 
where K and α Constants for a particular type of the building 
 A  The total floor area of the building 
 
Vrouwenvelder (1993) also described a similar method of representing the fire 
frequency in a building. The values for K and α for occupancies of all manufacturing 
industry, storage and offices are listed in Table 4-5 (Rasbash et al., 2004). 
 
Table 4-5: Constants of K and α for various occupancies, reproduced from Rasbash et al. (2004) 
Occupancy All manufacturing industry Storage Offices 
K 1.70 × 10-3 6.70 × 10-4 5.90 × 10-5 
α 0.53 0.5 0.9 
 
4.6.2 Fire Frequencies in Parking Buildings 
 
The vehicle fire frequency (F) in a New Zealand parking building can be given as: 
 
F = f × R × (A / P ) Equation 4-2 
 
where  f = 1.71 × 10-7 (visit-1) - vehicle fire frequency in the parking building 
     per vehicle visit 
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 R   - annual usage ratio or turnover ratio of the 
     parking building 
 A (m2)  - Total area of the parking building 
 P = 29 (m2/space) - Efficiency of parking for a parking building 
     (Chrest et al., 2000) 
 
The vehicle fire frequency of 1.71 × 10-7 (visit-1) was from section 4.3.1.4. As shown 
in section 1.2, the number of parking spaces in a parking building can be expressed by 
dividing the total floor area by Efficiency. The product of annual usage ratio (R) and 
number of parking spaces (A / P) then yields the annual vehicle visits based on 
discussion in section 4.3.1.3. Finally, the product of annual vehicle visits and vehicle 
fire frequency per visit give the annual fire frequency in a parking building. 
 
4.6.3 The Comparison 
 
The annual fire frequencies for buildings of three occupancies in Table 4-5 and 
parking buildings are shown as a function of the total floor area, based on the results 
from Equation 4-1 and Equation 4-2. 
 
The fire frequencies for parking buildings are plotted for three annual usage ratios: 
350, 1,000 and 10,000. The value of 350 represents the annual usage ratio from the 
statistics of Christchurch City Council’s parking buildings, as discussed in section 
4.3.1.3. 
 
The fire frequencies can also be expressed in Equation 4-1 term by obtaining the 
values of K and α for each annual usage ratio. The constant K was found to be  
2.00 × 10-6 (R=350), 6.00 × 10-6 (R=1,000) and 6.00 × 10-5 (R=10,000), while 
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Figure 4-4: Comparison of fire frequencies between general and parking buildings 
 
Figure 4-4 shows that the fire frequencies in the parking building are lower than those 
in the buildings of other occupancies when annual usage ratio is relatively low and 
rises with the increase of annual usage ratio. 
 
Equation 4-2 also indicates that vehicle fire frequency in the parking building is linear 









Chapter 5 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Sprinkler 




A cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of the provision of sprinklers in New Zealand parking 
buildings is presented in this chapter. The analysis is from the perspective of the 
owner of the parking building, which can be a standalone parking building or a 
building with some parts dedicated for vehicle parking. The parking building is 
assumed to be a separate firecell, when it adjoins the structure of other occupancies. 
Thus the fire and smoke can be confined within the parking building without 
spreading to the adjacent structures and vice versa. It is also assumed that structural 
collapse will not occur, as demonstrated by all the vehicle fire experiments in parking 
structures reviewed in section 2.2. 
 
The cost of fire damage to the structure was used for calculating the benefit of the 
provision of sprinklers in parking buildings. Although smoke poses a hazard to life 
safety in a vehicle fire, there are only two minor burn injuries each year caused by 
vehicle fires in New Zealand parking buildings as shown in section 3.2. In the US, 
Harris (1972) reported no injuries from 395 parking structure fires; while Denda 
(1993) found eight injuries, which were reported as not directly fire related, from over 
400 parking structure fires. Therefore because of the apparent rarity of injuries, the 
possible resulting financial loss in parking building fires was ignored and not included 
in this analysis. 
 
There was no fatality reported from 1995 to 2003 in New Zealand parking building 
fires as found in section 3.2. Similarly, two US studies (Harris, 1972; Denda, 1993) 
reviewed in section 2.5.2.1 and 2.5.2.2 indicated that there was no fatality in the 
parking structure fires. Consequently the financial loss from the death in parking 
building fires cannot be quantified and was hence not considered in this research. 
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There is still potential for the casualties in a parking building vehicle fire. However, 
this is not within the scope of this research, which is mainly concerned with the 
property protection. 
 
The activation of sprinklers, in the event of a vehicle fire, can prevent the fire spread 
between the neighbouring vehicles and protect the building structure. Nevertheless the 
damage to the burning vehicle is unavoidable; because the vehicle damage would 
already be significant before the sprinkler activation and sprinklers cannot extinguish 
the fire inside vehicle as discussed in section 2.2.2. Hence, the financial loss of 
vehicles in the parking building fire was also not included in the analysis.  
 
The interruption or loss of the business, following a vehicle fire in a non-sprinklered 
parking building, could cause the financial loss for the building owner e.g. loss of 
direct fee paying income. On the other hand, the provision of sprinklers in the parking 
building might allow the trade-off in building design and reduction of the insurance 
premium cost, which would contribute to the benefit of sprinklers in the parking 
building. However the relevant commercially sensitive data were unavailable for 
inclusion at the time of this research. 
 
In this chapter, vehicle fire risks in the parking building are identified on a yearly 
basis for both a non-sprinklered and a sprinklered situation. The costs of installing and 
maintaining sprinklers in parking buildings are also described. The cost-benefit 
analysis of sprinklers in New Zealand parking buildings is then presented as four 
scenarios considered in this research. Finally a case study, including sensitivity 













According to the level of the fire spread between parked vehicles or the number of 
vehicles involved due to a single ignition, vehicle fire risks in a non-sprinklered 
parking building can be classified into three fire spread scenarios, which are: 
 
• Single vehicle involved 
• Two vehicles involved 
• More than three vehicles involved 
 
In this research, the quantification of fire risks was envisaged as the product of the 
frequency with which a fire occurs, and the damage this fire causes. The vehicle fire 
risks in a non-sprinklered parking building can thus be expressed on a yearly basis as: 
 
Annualised 
Risk = ∑ 
Annual vehicle fire 








(dollar/year)  (year-1)  (dollar)  
 
For each scenario concerning the spread of fire between vehicles parked in a non-
sprinklered parking building, the annual fire frequency can be obtained as: 
 
Annual vehicle 
fire frequency for 
each fire spread 
scenario 
= 
Fire frequency per 
vehicle visit for 
each fire spread 
scenario 
× Total vehicle visits per year 
Equation 5-2 
(year-1)  (visit-1)  (visit/year)  
 
By assuming that fire damage is generally confined to the area a burning vehicle 




Fire damage for 
each fire spread 
scenario 
= 











(dollar)  (dollar/m2)  (m2)   
 Equation 5-3 
 
where      






parking spaces  
(m2)  (m2)    
 
Substituting Equation 5-2 and Equation 5-3 into Equation 5-1, the total annualised 
vehicle fire risk (dollar/year) in a non-sprinklered parking building can be written as: 
 
Annualised Risk = ∑ (f × n) × D × A × R Equation 5-4 
 
where f (visit-1) - Fire frequency in a non-sprinklered parking building per 
    vehicle visit for each fire spread scenario  
 n  - Number of vehicles involved in fire for each fire spread 
    scenario 
 D (dollar/m2) - Unit fire damage in a non-sprinklered parking building 
 A (m2)  - Total floor area of the parking building 
 R (visit/year) - Annual usage ratio defined as the ratio of annual vehicle 
    visits to number of parking spaces in the parking  
    building (see section 4.3.1.3) 
 
The details for parameters of f, n and D in Equation 5-4 are discussed in the following 
sections. The values for f and n can be found in Table 5-1. The details for annual 






5.2.2 f – Fire Frequency per Vehicle Visit for Each Fire Spread 
Scenario 
 
As discussed in section 5.2.1, vehicle fire risks in a non-sprinklered parking building 
are classified into three fire spread scenarios as shown in Table 5-1, according to the 
number of vehicles involved in fire. The fire frequency per vehicle visit for each 
scenario is obtained from the results of event tree for vehicle fires in a non-sprinklered 
parking building as shown in Table 4-4, by adding up the frequencies for each fire 
spread scenario. These frequencies are listed separately in Table 5-1 for both private 
and public type parking buildings. 
 
Table 5-1: Number of vehicles involved and vehicle fire frequencies for each fire spread scenario 
in non-sprinklered parking buildings 
Fire frequency per vehicle visit 




involved (n) Private parking building 
Public parking 
building 
More than three vehicles 4 1.79 × 10-9 0 
Two vehicles 2 3.57 × 10-9 0 
Single vehicle 1 9.46 × 10-8 7.14 × 10-8 
 
Private Public ∑ (f × n) 
1.09 × 10-7 7.14 × 10-8 
 
5.2.3 n – Number of Vehicles Involved for Each Fire Spread 
Scenario 
 
As discussed in section 3.5.1, there was one incident where four vehicles were 
involved in a parking building fire due to single ignition. This was also the only 
incident involving more than three vehicles in New Zealand parking building fires 
from 1995 to 2003. Thus for the scenario of more than three vehicles involved in a 




According to the fire spread scenarios discussed in section 5.2.1, there are three 
values for the number of vehicles involved (n), which are 1, 2 and 4. These values are 
also shown in Table 5-1. 
 
5.2.4 D – Unit Fire Damage in Non-Sprinklered Parking Buildings 
 
5.2.4.1 Fitted Distribution from Historical Data 
 
At the time of this research, information in financial terms regarding the damage 
caused by vehicle fires was not found for New Zealand parking buildings. The fire 
damages reported by a 1972 US study (Harris, 1972) reviewed in section 2.5.2.1 of 
this report, were used to determine the unit fire damage (D) in non-sprinklered 
parking buildings. The unit fire damage is the fire damage to the structure caused by 
vehicle fires and it is expressed in monetary value per unit area.  
 
This US study surveyed 1,686 automobile parking structures with a total of 778,000 
parking spaces in the United States and Canada. There were 395 fires reported during 
the entire life span of these structures. It was reported that 27 fires caused damage to 
the building and 368 fires resulted in damage confined to the vehicle. 
 
In 27 fires causing damage to building, the losses were recorded for 16 fires in US 
dollars; the remaining 11 fires were reported causing damages fewer than $5,000 USD 
dollars without further details. It was assumed in this research that each of these fires 
resulted in a loss of $2,500 USD. 
 
For 368 fires which caused no damage to the building according to the 1972 US study, 
it was assumed in this research that these fires still caused some minor damages to the 
building. The financial loss of $100 USD was assumed for each of these fires. 
 
The damage details for all 395 fires from the 1972 US study are shown in Table 5-2 in 




Table 5-2: Vehicle fire damages in parking buildings in 1972 US dollars, reproduced from Harris 
(1972) 
Damage in US dollars Value used in BESTFIT Number of fires 
$50,000 $50,000 (maximum) 1 
$40,000 $40,000 1 
$18,400 $18,400 1 
$9,000 $9,000 1 
$4,000 – 4,999 $4,500 1 
$1,000 – 1,999 $1,500 4 
$500 – 999 $750 2 
Under $500 $500 5 
Under $5,000; No details $2,500 11 
Total number of incidents with damage 27 
 
No damage reported $100 (minimum) 368 
 
Total number of incidents 395 
 
The “BestFit” programme (Palisade, 2002a) was used to find the appropriate 
distribution fitting these data in Table 5-2. “BestFit” is a programme that fits 
statistical distributions to input data and displays the results in graph and table forms. 
 
Two distributions, as shown in Figure 5-1, were found to reasonably fit the financial 
loss data of vehicle fire damage from Table 5-2. One fit was a triangle distribution 
with a mean of $16,779; the goodness-of-fit test was by Chi-Square method. Another 
fit was a normal distribution with a mean of $497; the goodness-of-fit test was by 
Kolmogorov-Smirinov method. The statistical details of these two fit results can be 
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Figure 5-1: Fitted distributions for vehicle fire damages in parking buildings in 1972 US dollars 
 
There was a significant difference in mean value between these two distributions. To 
achieve a more conservative result, the mean value of $16,779 USD from the triangle 
distribution was used to derive the unit fire damage in non-sprinklered parking 
buildings in New Zealand. It was also assumed that this value represents the loss from 
the damage confined in the parking area by a single vehicle. This assumption would 
yield a relatively conservative value of unit fire damage, because the 1972 US study 




5.2.4.2 Estimation of Unit Fire Damage in New Zealand Parking 
Buildings 
 
The loss of $16,779 USD represents the expected value of property damage caused by 
single vehicle fire in parking buildings in 1972 in the US. This figure needs to be 
inflated to the current monetary value before it can be converted to New Zealand 
currency to obtain the unit fire damage in New Zealand situation. The American 
Producer Price Index (PPI) was used to inflate this figure (E. Crampton, pers. Comm.). 
The trend of American PPI for industrial commodity from 1972 to 2003 is shown in 
Figure 5-2 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2004); the relevant data can also be found in 
Table C – 1, Appendix C. 
 
 
Figure 5-2: The trend of American Producer Price Index for industrial commodity from 1972 to 
2003, reproduced from U.S. Department of Labor (2004) 
 
The American PPI of industrial commodity for 1972 and 2003 were 37.8 and 139.1 
respectively. For single vehicle parking area, the property damage caused by vehicle 
fire can therefore be obtained in 2003 US dollars as: 
 




Using an Efficiency value of 29 m2 per space in the parking building as discussed in 
section 4.6.2, the unit fire damage by vehicle fire in a non-sprinklered parking 
building in US can be determined as: 
 
 $61,700 USD / 29 m2 = $2,129 USD/m2 
 
In 2003, the exchange rate between US dollar and New Zealand dollar (NZD) was 
approximately 0.55 USD/NZD (The Treasury, 2004), therefore the unit fire damage 
by vehicle fire in the parking building in 2003 New Zealand dollars is: 
 
 $2,129 USD / 0.55 = $3,871 NZD/m2 
 
This value was used to represent the unit fire damage (D) in Equation 5-4 in this 
analysis. As discussed in section 1.3, a property damage of $75,000 Australian dollars 
was reported for a fire incident involving three vehicles, in a non-sprinklered and 
closed car park (James, 2003). The exchange rate between Australian and New 
Zealand dollar was approximately 0.9 AUD/NZD in 2003 (The Treasury, 2004). 
Based on an Efficiency value of 29m2 per space, a unit fire damage of 958 NZD/m2 
can be derived from this Australian incident. This value seems to indicate that the unit 
fire damage value (3,871 NZ dollars/m2) used in this analysis is in the reasonable 
magnitude, although it is higher than the value derived from the Australian vehicle 
fire incident. 
 





Sprinklers can prevent the spread of fire between vehicles as discussed in section 4.4. 
Hence, there is only one fire spread scenario where a single vehicle is involved in fire 




The reduced annualised risk (dollar/year) in a sprinklered parking building can be 
derived in a similar manner as that in a non-sprinklered situation and expressed as: 
 
Reduced Annualised Risk = fs × (p × D) × A × R Equation 5-5 
 
where fs (visit-1) - Vehicle fire frequency in sprinklered parking building 
    per vehicle visit 
 p (%)  - Reduction percentage to allow reduced fire damage in 
    sprinklered parking building 
 
The parameters of fs and p are discussed in the following sections; the meanings of 
parameters D, A and R are same as those for a non-sprinklered parking building 
described in section 5.2. 
 
5.3.2 fs – Fire frequency in Sprinklered Situation 
 
The fire frequency, for both private and public sprinklered parking buildings, is based 
on the results of event tree for vehicle fires in sprinklered parking building from Table 
4-4. Similar to the non-sprinklered situation, these fire frequencies were obtained by 
adding up the frequencies on relevant branches for both private and public parking 
buildings, and listed in Table 5-3. 
 
Table 5-3: Vehicle fire frequencies in sprinklered parking buildings 
Frequency per vehicle visit 
(fs, year-1) – From Table 4-4 Scenario by number of vehicles involved Private parking building Public parking building 
Single vehicle 1.00 × 10-7 7.14 × 10-8 
 
For public parking buildings, the frequency in a sprinklered parking building is 
actually equal to the value of ∑ (f × n) for a non-sprinklered parking building from 





5.3.3 p – Reduction Percentage to Allow Reduced Fire Damage 
 
The vehicle fire controlled by sprinklers can still result in certain damage to the 
sprinkler protected parking building, which can be expressed as a percentage (p) of 
the unit fire damage to a non-sprinklered parking building. 
 
For a wide range of occupancies in the US, the average fire loss in a non-sprinklered 
building is approximately 4.5 times higher than that in an adequately sprinklered 
building (Rasbash et al., 2004). Based on this value, the ratio between the fire loss in 
the sprinklered and non-sprinklered buildings is about 0.18. The damage to those 
vehicles involved in the parking building fire is not considered in the cost-benefit 
analysis in this research, so a lower value of reduction percentage would be 
appropriate. A value of 15% was assumed for p in this research. 
 





The costs for installing and maintaining sprinkler systems in New Zealand parking 
buildings are presented in this section (C. Mak, pers. Comm.). These costs were the 
figures at the time of the research and in New Zealand dollars. 
 
Two cost types are given, fixed and marginal. In particular, the fixed cost depends on 
the availability of the existing sprinkler system in a parking building. When a parking 
building is part of the building already protected by sprinklers, the fixed costs for 
installation and maintenance is generally zero. 
 
The sprinkler costs were therefore categorised to the availability of extending from an 
existing sprinkler system. The category of Available would include the sprinkler 
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system for parking building in or adjoining a building already protected by sprinklers; 
whereas the category of Not Available would involve the system for a standalone 
parking building. 
 
5.4.2 Annual Maintenance Cost 
 
The annual maintenance costs for sprinkler system in the parking building are 
generally composed of fixed and marginal costs for inspection of the sprinkler system. 
The fixed cost includes the monthly testing and biennial inspection of the sprinkler 
system. Table 5-4 summarises both costs according to the availability of extending 
from an existing sprinkler system. 
 
Table 5-4: Annual maintenance cost of the sprinkler system in parking buildings 
Annual maintenance cost Extending from 
an existing 
sprinklers Fixed MF - dollar/year Marginal Mm - dollar/(m
2year) 
Available 0 0.025 
Not Available 750 0.025 
 
Therefore the annual maintenance costs of sprinklers can be obtained based on the 
availability of an existing system. 
 
For extension from an existing sprinkler system Available, the annual maintenance 
cost of sprinkler system (dollar/year) in the parking building is: 
Annual Maintenance Cost = Mm × A Equation 5-6 
 
For extension from an existing sprinkler system Not Available, the annual 
maintenance cost of sprinkler system (dollar/year) in the parking building is: 







where A (m2)   - Total floor area of the parking building 
 MF (dollar/year) - Annual fixed maintenance cost 
 Mm (dollar/(m2year)) - Annual marginal maintenance cost per unit 
     floor area 
 
5.4.3 Initial Cost 
 
The initial sprinkler costs for sprinkler system in the parking building generally 
consist of a fixed cost for water supply to the system and a marginal cost for installing 
sprinklers. These are shown in Table 5-5 according to the availability of extending 
from an existing sprinkler system, similar to annual maintenance cost. 
 
Table 5-5: Initial cost of the sprinkler system in parking buildings 
Initial cost Extending from an 
existing sprinklers Fixed IF - dollar Marginal Im - dollar/m2 
Available 0 12 
Not available 20,000 12 
 
The fixed initial cost involved the expense for water supply and did not include the 
expense for pump, which is generally not required in parking building situation due to 
the relatively low flow rate demand by the system. The initial marginal cost was based 
on the normal sprinkler heads, with a maximum spacing of 12 m2 per head. 
 
Hence initial costs of sprinklers can be obtained based on the availability of an 
existing system as follows. 
 
For extension from an existing sprinkler system Available, the initial cost of sprinkler 
system in the parking building (dollar) is: 
Initial Cost = Im × A Equation 5-8 
 
For extension from an existing sprinkler system Not Available, the initial cost of 
sprinkler system in the parking building (dollar) is: 
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Initial Cost = IF + Im × A Equation 5-9 
 
where A (m2)  - Total floor area of the parking building 
 IF (dollar) - Fixed initial cost 
 Im (dollar/m2) - Marginal initial cost per unit floor area 
 
5.5 Analysis by Cost-Benefit Ratio Method 
 
5.5.1 The Approach 
 
The concept of cost-benefit analysis for the sprinkler system in a parking building is 
to determine what the financial advantage would have been, if the cost for installation 
of the sprinkler system had been put into a comparatively risky investment. This 
financial advantage can then be compared with the benefit gained from the installation 
of the sprinkler system in a parking building. 
 
This benefit from sprinklers is represented by the annual avoidance of cost that could 
have incurred due to vehicle fires in a non-sprinklered parking building, had 
sprinklers not been installed. The cost for sprinklers is identified as the initial cost for 
installation of sprinkler system described in section 5.4.3. 
 
The criterion of cost-benefit ratio is commonly used for the comparison of the 
alternative investment projects. This measure was also used for the cost-benefit 
analysis of provision of sprinklers in New Zealand parking buildings in this research. 
With this method, the financial equivalent benefit is divided by the financial 
equivalent cost to yield cost-benefit ratio. 
 
The financial equivalent benefit is the present worth of the annual cost avoidance of 
fire damage by installing the sprinkler system. This present worth is expressed as the 
product of annual cost avoidance and the series present worth factor, which converts 
the annual cost avoidance to present worth based on a certain discount rate. The 
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financial equivalent cost is the initial cost of the sprinkler system installation. The 
cost-benefit ratio, denoted as B/C, can then be expressed as (Barry, 2002): 
 
Annual Cost Avoidance × Series Present Worth Factor  B/C = Initial Cost  
Equation 5-10 
 
When the cost-benefit ratio (B/C) is greater than one, it indicates that the benefit is 
greater than the cost. Alternatively it means that an investment higher than the initial 
cost of sprinklers is required to achieve the return equivalent to the benefit (annual 
cost avoidance) from sprinklers based on a certain discount rate. Thus, the installation 
of the sprinkler system in a parking building is economically acceptable. Conversely, 
if the cost-benefit ratio is less than one, the provision of sprinklers is considered as 
economically unacceptable. 
 
5.5.2 Annual Cost Avoidance 
 
The annual cost avoidance of vehicle fire damage by sprinklers in the parking 

















(dollar/year)  (dollar/year)  (dollar/year)  (dollar/year) 
 Equation 5-11 
 
The three parameters in Equation 5-11 have been discussed in previous sections. The 
annualised risk and reduced annualised risk can be found in section 5.2.1 and 5.3.1 
respectively, while annual maintenance cost is described in section 5.4.2. 
 
For the sprinkler system which can be extended from an existing installation, the 
annual cost avoidance can be obtained, by substituting Equation 5-4, Equation 5-5 and 







= [ ( ∑ (f × n) − fs × p ) × D × R − Mm ] × A Equation 5-12 
 
For the sprinkler system which cannot be extended from an existing installation, the 
annual cost avoidance can be obtained similarly, by substituting Equation 5-4, 





= [ ( ∑ (f × n) − fs × p ) × D × R − Mm ] × A − MF Equation 5-13 
 
5.5.3 Series Present Worth Factor and Discount Rate 
 
As given in Chapter 5-7 of SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering (DiNenno, 
2002), the symbol (P/A, i , N) is used to describe series present worth factor, which 
can be expressed in the form as shown in Equation 5-14: 
 
(P/A, i , N) = [ (1 + i )N – 1 ] ⁄ [ i × ( 1 + i )N ]  Equation 5-14 
 
where P/A - Present worth of the annual cost avoidance 
 i (%) - Discount rate 
 N - Number of the years considered in the analysis 
 
Discount rate is the annual percentage rate at which the present value of a future 
monetary value decreases through a certain period of time. It is used to convert all 
costs and benefits to the net present value or present worth, so that the comparison 
between alternative investment options can be performed. A discount rate (i) of 10%, 
which is used by the New Zealand Treasury for government project (Young, 2002), 
was selected for the cost-benefit analysis in this research. 
 
In this analysis, a service life of 50 years was assumed for general parking buildings 
in New Zealand. It was also believed that the sprinkler system would not have to be 
replaced during the whole life span of the building; hence the life of the sprinkler 
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system installed in a parking building was assumed to be 50 years. The number of the 




5.6.1 Four Scenarios Considered 
 
A total of four scenarios were considered for the cost-benefit analysis of provision of 
sprinklers in parking buildings, according to the availability of the existing sprinkler 
system and the type of the parking building. Table 5-6 listed these four scenarios for 
cost-benefit analysis in this research. 
 
Table 5-6: Four scenarios considered in CBA of sprinkler provision in parking buildings 
Scenario No. Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Extension from 
existing sprinklers Available Not-Available 
Type of parking 
building Private Public Private Public 
 
The equations of cost-benefit ratio for all the scenarios in Table 5-6 are presented in 
the following sections. 
 
5.6.2 Sprinkler Extension Available – Scenario 1 (Private) and 2 
(Public) 
 
For the sprinkler system which can be extended from an existing installation, the cost-
benefit ratio can be obtained by substituting the annual cost avoidance (Equation 5-12) 
and initial cost (Equation 5-8) into Equation 5-10 and written as:  
 
( ∑ (f × n) − fs × p ) × D × R − Mm B/C = 
Im 




Series present worth factor is expressed by Equation 5-14. The annual fixed 
maintenance cost (MF) and fixed initial cost (IF) for sprinklers in this situation are zero 
and hence do not exist in the equation. The total floor area (A) is also cancelled out in 
the equation.  
 
Annual usage ratio (R) is the only variable in the equation for the parking building 
where extension from existing sprinklers is available. The summary of all the 
parameters in Equation 5-15 can be found in Table 5-7 in section 5.6.4. 
 
5.6.3 Sprinkler Extension Not Available – Scenario 3 (Private) and 
4 (Public) 
 
For the sprinkler system which cannot be extended from an existing installation, the 
cost-benefit ratio can be obtained by substituting the annual cost avoidance (Equation 
5-13) and initial cost (Equation 5-9) into Equation 5-10 and written as: 
 
[ ( ∑ (f × n) − fs × p ) × D × R − Mm ] × A − MF B/C = 
IF + Im × A 
× (P/A, i , N) 
    Equation 5-16 
 
Series present worth factor is described by Equation 5-14. Compared with Equation 
5-15 for Scenario 1 and 2, this equation has three more parameters, which are annual 
fixed maintenance cost (MF), Fixed initial cost (IF) and total floor area of the parking 
building (A). The two variables are annual usage ratio (R) and total floor area of the 
parking building (A). The summary of all the parameters in Equation 5-16 is shown in 
Table 5-7 in section 5.6.4. 
 
5.6.4 Summary of Inputs for Four Scenarios 
 
All the parameters in Equation 5-15 and Equation 5-16 are summarised in Table 5-7, 




Table 5-7: Parameter summary of four scenarios considered in CBA 
Scenarios Considered In Analysis 






Private Public Private Public 
∑ (f × n) visit-1 1.09 × 10-7 7.14 × 10-8 1.09 × 10-7 7.14 × 10-8 
fs visit-1 1.00 × 10-7 7.14 × 10-8 1.00 × 10-7 7.14 × 10-8 
D dollar/m2 3870 3870 3870 3870 
p % 15% 15% 15% 15% 
MF dollar/year 0 0 750 750 
Mm dollar/(m2year) 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 
IF dollar 0 0 20,000 20,000 
Im dollar/m2 12 12 12 12 
(P/A, i , N) - 9.9148 9.9148 9.9148 9.9148 
i % 10% 10% 10% 10% 
N year 50 50 50 50 
R visit/year variable variable variable variable 
A m2 - - variable variable 
 
The meaning of symbols in Table 5-7 is listed as follows: 
 
∑ (f × n) ∑ (Fire frequency per vehicle visit in a non-sprinklered parking  
  building for each fire spread scenario × Number of vehicles involved
  in fire) 
fs  Fire frequency per vehicle visit in a sprinklered parking building  
D  Unit fire damage in a non-sprinklered parking building 
p  Reduction percentage to allow reduced fire damage in a sprinklered 
  parking building 
MF  Annual fixed maintenance cost 
Mm  Annual marginal maintenance cost per unit floor area 
IF  Fixed initial cost 
Im  Marginal initial cost per unit floor area 
(P/A, i , N) Series present worth factor 
i  Discount rate 
N  Number of years considered in cost-benefit analysis 
R  Annual usage ratio defined as annual vehicle visits divided by the 
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  number of parking spaces in a parking building 
A  Total floor area of the parking building considered in the analysis 
-  Not applicable (see section 5.6.2) 
 
For Scenario 1 and 2 where the extension from existing sprinklers is available, annual 
usage ratio (R) is the only variable in the analysis. For Scenario 3 and 4 where the 
extension from existing sprinklers is not available, annual usage ratio (R) and total 




5.7.1 Sprinkler Extension Available – Scenario 1 (Private) and 
Scenario 2 (Public) 
 
The results from Equation 5-15 are shown in Figure 5-3, for Scenario 1 and Scenario 
2 (as described in Table 5-6). The details of the results for both scenarios can be found 
in Table C – 3, Appendix C. 
 




















Scenario 1 – Private parking building Scenario 2 – Public parking building 
 
Figure 5-3: CBA results for sprinkler extension available: Scenario 1 (Private) and Scenario 2 
(Public) – From Table C – 3, Appendix C 
 
In Scenario 1, the cost-benefit ratio reaches 1 at the annual usage ratio of 
approximately 3,500. In Scenario 2, the cost-benefit ratio gets to 1 at the annual usage 
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ratio of around 5,000. One would consider these annual usage ratios as significantly 
high, in comparison to a real annual usage ratio value of 350 found in section 4.3.1.3. 
The provision of sprinklers in the parking building would be considered economically 
unacceptable from the perspective of parking building owner. 
 
5.7.2 Sprinkler Extension Not Available – Scenario 3 (Private) and 
Scenario 4 (Public) 
 
The results from Equation 5-16 can be seen in Figure 5-4, for Scenario 3 and Scenario 
4 (as described in Table 5-6). The details of the results for Scenario 3 and Scenario 4 





























































Scenario 4 - Not Available & Public
Scenario 3 – Private parking building Scenario 4 – Public parking building 
 
Figure 5-4: CBA results for sprinkler extension not available: Scenario 3 (Private) and Scenario 4 
(Public) – From Table C – 4 and Table C – 5, Appendix C 
 
In Scenario 3, the cost-benefit ratio starts to reach 1 for the parking building with a 
total floor area of more than 3,000 m2 and an annual usage ratio of around 6,000. 
When the total floor area of a parking building gets to 50,000 m2, the cost-benefit 
ratio reaches 1 at the annual usage ratio of approximately 3,500. 
 
In Scenario 4, the cost-benefit ratio starts to reach 1 for the parking building with a 
total floor area of more than 20,000 m2 and an annual usage ratio of around 6,000. 
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When the total floor area of a parking building gets to 50,000 m2, the cost-benefit 
ratio reaches 1 at the annual usage ratio of approximately 5,500. 
 
Similar to Scenario 1 and 2, the annual usage ratios at which cost-benefit ratios reach 
1 in these two scenarios are considered quite high. The provision of sprinklers in the 
parking building would again be considered economically unacceptable from the 
perspective of parking building owner. 
 
5.7.3 Closed Parking Building – Four Scenarios 
 
The results presented in the previous two sections were based on probabilities from 
FIRS data, which do not report the openness of the parking building. However the 
studies by Schleich et al. (1999) and Steinert (2000), as reviewed in section 2.1, 
indicate that without the intervention, the fire spread between parked vehicles tend to 
occur in a closed parking building. This was also suggested by the works of BHP 
(1987) and Kitano et al. (2000) which were also reviewed in section 2.2. The 
historical case studies about vehicle fire incidents in closed parking buildings, 
presented in section 1.3, further highlight the issue of fire spread within the closed 
parking building. It is therefore necessary to investigate the effect in the cost-benefit 
analysis by considering the likely fire spread in the situation of a closed parking 
building. 
 
For closed parking buildings, the probabilities for the branch of Spread in the pathway 
of Fire Spread in the event for non-sprinklered parking building (Figure 4-2) were all 
changed to 100%. Based on the assumption that sprinklers can confine the fire within 
single vehicle, the event tree for a sprinklered parking building (Figure 4-3) can still 
be applied. Therefore ∑ (f × n) in Table 5-7 was 2.75 × 10-7 for private buildings and 
1.93 × 10-7 for public buildings respectively, while other parameters in this table 
stayed unchanged. The results from cost-benefit analysis, for all four scenarios in 
Table 5-6, are shown in Figure 5-5. Further details of the results can be found in Table 
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Scenario 4 - Not Available & Public
Sprinkler extension not available 
Scenario 3 – Private parking building Scenario 4 – Public parking building 
 
Figure 5-5: CBA results of closed parking building for all four scenarios (From Table C – 6, 
Table C – 7 and Table C – 8, Appendix C) 
 
In Scenario 1 and 2, the cost-benefit ratio reaches 1 at the annual usage ratio (R) of 
approximately 1,500 and 2,000 respectively. 
 
In Scenario 3 and 4, for the parking building with a total floor area of more than  
1,000 m2, the cost-benefit ratio starts to reach 1 at the annual usage ratio of 4,000 and 
5,500 respectively. For Scenario 3, B/C also begins to reach 1 at the annual usage 
ratio of 1,500, when the total floor area of a parking building gets to 8,000 m2. For 
Scenario 4, B/C begins to reach 1 at the annual usage ratio of 2,000, when the total 




These annual usage ratios are significantly lower than those values from the results 
based on FIRS data, presented in section 5.7.1 and 5.7.2. So the sprinkler system 
appears to start to justify itself in the closed parking building, where fire spread 
between vehicles is considered as an expected event. It should be noted that this 
analysis is not based on the statistical data from FIRS, and one needs to take caution 
when interpreting these results. 
 
5.8 A Case Study Using @RISK 
 
5.8.1 The Parking Building in Consideration 
 
Based on the cost-benefit analysis model introduced earlier in the chapter, further 
analysis was performed for a public parking building with an overall floor area of 
30,000 m2 using Monte-Carlo simulation in @RISK software (Palisade, 2002b). A 
parking building of this size can provide over 1,000 parking spaces with an Efficiency 
of 29 m2/space and is generally considered as a large size parking building in New 
Zealand. In terms of the extension from the existing sprinkler system, two scenarios 
were considered, which were Available and Not Available. These correspond to 
Scenario 2 and Scenario 4 as defined in Table 5-6. For Scenario 2 where the extension 
from an existing system is available, the total floor area (A) is irrelevant in the 
analysis as discussed in section 5.6.2. 
 
5.8.2 Introduction to @RISK Programme 
 
@RISK software is an “add-on” application in the EXCEL programme. In @RISK, 
each input variable is assigned a probability distribution, which effectively includes 
the uncertainty of every input in the analysis. The model is then run in the @RISK 
programme using the technique of Monte Carlo simulation and results with all 
possible outcomes are generated. The Monte Carlo simulation in @RISK can be 






For each input, Table 5-8 shows the probability distribution type with relevant 
statistical parameters such as minimum, mean (or expected value), maximum and 
standard deviation. These inputs are those appearing in Equation 5-15 (section 5.6.2), 
Equation 5-16 (section 5.6.3) and in Table 5-7 (section 5.6.4); the probability 
distribution was defined in @RISK programme for each input. Scenario 4 (sprinkler 
extension not available) has two more inputs than Scenario 2 (sprinkler extension 
available). These two inputs are annual fixed maintenance cost (MF) and fixed initial 
cost (IF) for sprinklers. 
 
Table 5-8: Details of probability distribution for each input in @RISK 
Statistics 
Input Description Distribution 
type Minimum Mean Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
For Scenario 2 (sprinkler extension available) and Scenario 4 (sprinkler extension not available) 
Non-sprinklered – ∑ f × n Normal 0 7.14 × 10-8 +indefinite 7.14 × 10-9 
Sprinklered – fs Normal 0 7.14 × 10-8 +indefinite 7.14 × 10-9 
Unit fire damage – D Triangle 23 3870 11536 - 
Reduction percentage – p Normal 0.00 0.15 1.00 0.015 
Annual marginal maint. – Mm Triangle 0.020 0.025 0.030 - 
Marginal initial – Im Triangle 10 12 14 - 
Discount rate – i Triangle 0.05 0.10 0.15 - 
Annual usage ratio – R Lognormal 0 350 +indefinite 350 
For Scenario 4 (sprinkler extension not available) only 
Annual fixed maint. – MF Triangle 500 750 1000 - 
Fixed initial – IF Triangle 15000 20000 25000 - 
 
The type of probability distribution for each input is based on engineering judgements, 
except for unit fire damage (D). The mean of each distribution is taken as the 
corresponding value in Table 5-7 for each input. The minimum and maximum for 
each distribution are also assumed values, except for unit fire damage (D). For normal 
distribution type, the standard deviation is taken as 10% of the mean value. Unit fire 
damage (D) is represented by the triangle distribution, which is also used to fit the 
historical fire damage in Figure 5-1. The mean value is taken as the unit fire damage 
value derived in section 5.2.4.2. The values of minimum and maximum are obtained 
from the 1972 US data in Table 5-2 using the same method for deriving unit fire 
damage value as shown in section 5.2.4.2. The distribution graph from @RISK 




5.8.4 Output Results 
 
The cost-benefit ratios (B/C) in Equation 5-15 and Equation 5-16 were identified as 
the outputs in @RISK programme, for both scenarios which are extension from 
existing sprinklers Available (Scenario 2) and Not Available (Scenario 4). 
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Figure 5-6: The distribution of cost-benefit ratio from @RISK for a public parking building 




The distributions of output results from @RISK, as shown in Figure 5-6, are similar 
for both scenarios. The distribution type of Pearson5 fits both results according to 
goodness-of-fit tests in @RISK. This seems to relate to the probability distribution of 
annual usage ratio (R), which is a Lognormal type. The mean of cost-benefit ratio is 
0.049 for the scenario of sprinkler extension available and 0.026 for the scenario of 
sprinkler extension not available. 
 
Figure 5-6 also indicates that for sprinkler extension available (Scenario 2), the 
cumulative probability is 99.7% when cost-benefit ratio is less than 1. For sprinkler 
extension not available (Scenario 4), the cumulative probability is 99.9%, for cost-
benefit ratio being less than 1. Hence, the probability of cost-benefit ratio exceeding 
the value of 1 is 0.3% for Scenario 2 and 0.1% for Scenario 4 situation. For both 
scenarios, the provision of sprinklers would be considered economically unacceptable 
for this public parking building with a total floor area of 30,000 m2. 
 
The statistical details of output result for both scenarios can be found in Table C – 10 
for Scenario 2 and Table C – 11 for Scenario 4 in Appendix C. 
 
5.8.5 Sensitivity Analysis of Inputs 
 
The regression tornado graphs in Figure 5-7 show the regression sensitivity of each 
input for both scenarios. Each input is ranked according to how sensitive the cost-
benefit ratio is to the input distribution. 
 
The coefficients shown in the regression tornado graphs are normalized regression 
coefficients associated with each input. A regression value of 0 indicates that there is 
no significant relationship between the input and the cost-benefit ratio. A regression 
value of 1 or -1 shows that there is a standard deviation change of 1 or -1 in the cost-
benefit ratio, for a standard deviation change of 1 in the input. The regression 
sensitivity results from @RISK show that annual usage ratio (R) has the most 
influence on the output of cost-benefit ratio, for both scenarios. For Scenario 2, the 
next three critical inputs by ranking are unit fire damage (D), discount rate (i), and 
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non-sprinklered ∑ (f × n). For Scenario 4, the next three critical inputs by ranking are 
unit fire damage (D), non-sprinklered ∑ (f × n), and discount rate (i). 
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Figure 5-7: Ranking of inputs by regression sensitivity for both scenarios (From Table C – 12 and 
Table C – 13, Appendix C) 
 
In regression tornado graphs for both scenarios, there are three inputs having a 
positive impact on the output of cost-benefit ratio. Those inputs are annual usage ratio 









Chapter 6 Conclusions 
 
6.1 Statistics from FIRS Data 
 
During the eight-year period from 1995 to 2003, there were a total of 96 fire incidents 
in New Zealand parking buildings involving vehicles or on average 12 vehicle fire 
incidents each year in New Zealand parking buildings. There were a total of eight 
vehicles involved in three multiple vehicle fire incidents, which equate to 
approximately 3% of total vehicle fire incidents in New Zealand parking buildings. 
 
The four leading causes of vehicle fires in parking buildings were found to be 
deliberately lit, electrical faults, mechanical failure or malfunction, and carelessness. 
 
The average age of vehicles involved in New Zealand parking building fires was 14.3 
years old. It was also found that the probability of a vehicle being involved in a 
parking building fire rises with the increase of the vehicle age. 
 
6.2 Risk Assessment of Vehicle Fires in Parking Buildings 
 
Event tree analysis was carried out for vehicle fire risks in New Zealand parking 
buildings. The frequency of vehicle fires in New Zealand parking buildings was 
estimated to be 1.71 × 10-7 per each visit. Annual vehicle fire frequencies in New 
Zealand parking buildings are lower than those in the buildings of other occupancies 
when annual usage ratio for the parking building is relatively low, and increases with 
the annual usage ratio. 
 
The cost-benefit analysis for the provision of sprinklers in the parking building was 
performed based on the FIRS statistics and event tree analysis of vehicle fires in New 
Zealand parking buildings. The analysis indicated that the automatic sprinkler system 
generally does not justify itself, from the building owner’s point of view for both 
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private and public type buildings. This appears to agree with the requirement placed 
by Acceptable Solution (C/AS1) in New Zealand Building Code, where the provision 
of sprinklers is non-mandatory. The sensitivity analysis of cost-benefit analysis, for a 
public parking building with a total floor area of 30,000 m2 in the case study, shows 









As discussed in section 1.1, this report attempts to answer those questions about 
vehicle fires in parking buildings, which were raised from the internet news groups’ 
discussion within international fire safety engineering community, in a New Zealand 
context. The statistics of vehicle fires in parking buildings in Chapter 3 provides the 
answers to likelihood of vehicle fires/fire spreads, causes of vehicle fires, and 
materials involved in fire. The literature review in Chapter 2 covers the severity of the 
vehicle fires in a parking building situation. The cost-benefit analysis in Chapter 5 
investigates the appropriateness of sprinkler provision in the parking building from 
the perspective of property protection and building owner’s point of view. 
 
7.2 Life Safety vs. Property Protection 
 
In this research, the result from the cost-benefit analysis agrees with the requirement 
placed by Acceptable Solution (C/AS1) in New Zealand Building Code; however it 
should be noted that the building code is primarily concerned with the provision of the 
life safety. Therefore it is also necessary to evaluate the effect of vehicle fire on life 
safety in the parking building, although the statistics in both New Zealand and the US 
do not indicate any fatality in such circumstance. All the experimental work reviewed 
in section 2.2 was concerned with the property protection in the event of a vehicle fire. 
In this research, literature about the effect of vehicle fire on life safety in the parking 
building was not found. Future research is hence recommended to investigate the life 
safety issue in the event of a parking building vehicle fire. For example, the effect of 
sprinkler activation on smoke production can be one of the subjects as the 




7.3 Method of Entering Data of Vehicle Fire Incidents into 
FIRS 
 
A vehicle fire inside a parking building, where the equipment being involved is 
recorded as a motor vehicle, should be classified as a structure fire rather than being 
classified as a mobile property fire. Structure fires should have a higher priority than 
mobile property fires because of the potential property loss. This will also provide the 
useful information such as the impact of vehicle fires on the building and the 
performance of fire protection measures etc. for later study of these fire incidents. 
 
7.4 Vehicle Design Fire 
 
When a design fire is represented by the t-squared fire, the expected growth rate is to 
be a value between slow and medium growth rate based on the literature reviews 
carried out in this research. The peak HRR can vary from approximately 4 MW to 
9 MW, depending on the amount of energy to be released from the vehicle in 
consideration. If the ventilation condition is close to that in a closed car park, the fire 
spread between vehicles is to be considered. 
 
The design fire indicates the potential severity to be reached in a vehicle fire and 
highlights the necessity of assessing the life safety in the situation of a vehicle fire in 
the parking building. 
 
7.5 Event Tree Model 
 
The prerequisite of the fire spread between vehicles is that vehicles in consideration 
are parked next to each other. When a vehicle catches fire and there are no 
neighbouring vehicles, the fire spread to other vehicles is not likely to happen. 
Therefore the density of vehicle parking in a non-sprinklered parking building would 
affect the probabilities of fire spread between vehicles. To simplify the event tree 
model, it is assumed that there are always vehicles adjacent to the one first ignited. As 
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a result, certain probabilities were assigned to the pathway of Fire Spread in the event 
tree for a non-sprinklered parking building (Figure 4-2). Since current model assumes 
a maximum potential for car-to-car fire spread due to neighbouring vehicles, it is 
likely that the model gives a higher benefit to sprinklers than where the probability of 
car-to-car fire spread is a function of parking density. It is hence recommended to 
incorporate the variation of the parking density into the event tree model in the future 
research. 
 
7.6 Consideration of the Loss of Business 
 
The cost-benefit analysis in this research does not consider the loss of business caused 
by a vehicle fire in the parking building, as discussed in section 5.1. Nevertheless, for 
a parking building with relative large capacity (total floor area) and high occupancy 
(annual usage ratio), the provision of sprinklers already becomes economically 
justified without considering the loss of business, as shown by analysis results in 
section 5.7. On the other hand, the loss of business probably does not have a 
significant impact on the analysis results for a parking building with large capacity 
and low usage, where the parking spaces not affected by the fire damage can always 
be utilised. 
 
The inclusion of the loss of business may affect the analysis results for a parking 
building of small capacity. Nevertheless, such parking buildings tend to be private 
type parking buildings and the loss of business may not be a concern as it would have 
been for those parking buildings owned by the parking operators etc. 
 
7.7 Provision of Smoke Control System 
 
Various case studies and experiments have highlighted the potential hazard to human 
life safety posed by the extensive smoke production in a vehicle fire, particularly in 
the situation of a closed parking building. It is therefore necessary to install the 
appropriate smoke control system in the enclosed parking building especially when 
the sprinkler system is not provided, so that tenable conditions can be provided for 
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both occupants and fire-fighters. This is also required by the Acceptable Solution 
(C/AS1) in New Zealand Building Code for this particular situation. 
 
When applying the cost-benefit analysis methodologies presented in this report for a 
particular parking building, one needs to obtain appropriate annual usage ratio (R), 
discount rate (i), non-sprinklered ∑ (f × n), and unit fire damage (D) for the building 
under consideration, such that a more accurate result of cost-benefit ratio can be found. 
 
7.8 Areas for Future Research 
 
Future research is recommended in the following areas: 
 
• Statistical analysis of general vehicle fire incidents. There were 26,969 of such 
fires in New Zealand from 1995 to 2003 according to FIRS database 
 
• Carry out experiments on newer cars to investigate: 
 
o Severity of car fires 
o Potential of car-to-car fire spread 
o Effectiveness of sprinklers on car fires 
o Impact of car firs on property protection and life safety 
 
• Incorporate the variation of the parking density into the event tree model 
 
• Improve the cost-benefit model by: 
 
o Incorporating the financial data for interruption or loss of the business 
caused by vehicle fires in parking buildings 
o Incorporating insurance premium reduction by the provision of 
sprinklers to a parking building 
o Obtaining more data for the cost of fire damage to the parking building 
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o Assigning distribution to key parameters based on relevant data instead 
of engineering assumption when performing case study 
 
• Obtain the statistical data of annual usage ratio, which is the most critical input 
for the cost-benefit analysis according to the results of regression sensitivity 
from the case study in section 5.8.5 
 
• Evaluate the impact on life safety by a vehicle fire in the parking building. A 
series of fire scenarios can be devised to incorporate the design fire, openness 
of the structure, building geometry, provision of fire safety system, and escape 
route etc. These scenarios can be run in certain zone/field computer models 
and calculations of RSET (required safe escape time) and ASET (available 
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Appendix A Statistical Details of Vehicle Fires in New Zealand Parking Buildings, 1995 - 
2003 
 
The terminologies used in the breakdown of statistical details are from the descriptions in New Zealand Fire Service Fire Incident Reporting 
System Instruction & Coding Manual (New Zealand Fire Service, 1995). 
 
Table A – 1: Specific type of parking buildings where vehicles were involved in fires, 1995 – 2003 
  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 TOTAL 
Private fleet carpark: Car, Bus, Truck (Single level - covered) 9 11 11 11 9 3 1 6 61 
Public carpark: Multi-storied above ground 5 1 1 1 0 0 3 3 14 
Public carpark: Single level - covered 0 2 2 4 2 1 0 1 12 
Public carpark: Multi-storied below ground 1 0 3 0 1 1 1 0 7 
Public carpark: Multi-storied above and below ground 1 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 7 





Table A – 2: Supposed causes of vehicles fires in parking buildings, 1995 – 2003 
  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 TOTAL 
Deliberately lit 2 6 1 5 6 1 1 5 27 
Electrical faults 6 3 8 3 1 2 0 2 25 
Mechanical failure or malfunction 4 3 3 1 1 1 3 1 17 
Carelessness 1 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 13 
Unknown 3 1 2 5 1 0 0 0 12 
Others 0 1 2 0 3 0 0 1 7 
TOTAL 16 18 18 16 13 5 5 10 101 
           
Deliberately lit          
Unlawful 2 4 0 3 2 0 1 4 16 
Suspicious 0 2 1 2 4 1 0 1 11 
Electrical faults          
Short circuit, earth fault 6 2 7 3 1 1 0 0 20 
Other electrical failure 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 5 
Mechanical failure or malfunction          
Part failure, leak or break 4 3 0 1 1 0 1 1 11 
Equipment not being operated properly 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Installed too close to combustibles 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Other installation deficiency 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Equipment overloaded 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Lack of maintenance 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Carelessness          
Careless disposal: cigarettes, cigars, ashes, embers 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 
Heat source too close to combustibles: fires under trees, 
welding/cutting operations, debris 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 3 
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  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 TOTAL 
Combustible placed too close to heat source 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Failure to use ordinary care 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Reckless act 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
People playing with heat sources 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Flammable liquid/gas spilled or accidentally released 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Unknown          
Unknown 2 1 2 4 1 0 0 0 10 
Unable to classify 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Not Recorded 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Others          
Exposure fire 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 
Backfire 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 





Table A – 3: Vehicles fires in parking buildings by number of vehicles involved, 1995 – 2003 
 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 TOTAL 
Single 14 18 18 16 9 5 5 8 93 
Multiple 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 8 
All 16 18 18 16 13 5 5 10 101 
 
Table A – 4: Type of vehicles involved in fires in parking buildings, 1995 – 2003 
  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 TOTAL 
Car, Taxi, Ambulance 0 12 15 10 4 3 5 8 57 
Unknown 16 1 0 2 3 0 0 1 23 
Other Vehicles 0 4 2 4 3 2 0 0 15 
Bus 0 1 1 0 3 0 0 1 6 
TOTAL 16 18 18 16 13 5 5 10 101 
           
Unknown          
Not Recorded 16 1 0 2 3 0 0 0 22 
Unable to Classify 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Other Vehicles          
Truck: One tonne and over, Fire appliance 0 2 2 3 2 1 0 0 10 
Light truck: Under one tonne, Ute, Van, Wagon 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 





Table A – 5: Distribution comparison between age of vehicles involved in parking building fires from 1998 to 2003 and age of all registered vehicles in 1998 
Age of vehicle 
Percentage of vehicles involved 
in fires in parking building, 
1995-2003 
Percentage of vehicles 
registered in NZ as at 1st 
January 1998  
0 to 2 4% 7% 
3 to 5 8% 11% 
6 to 10 19% 33% 
11 to 15 37% 29% 
16 to 20 17% 12% 
21 to 25 4% 4% 
26 to 30 6% 2% 
over 30 6% 2% 
 
Table A – 6: Mean age for major vehicles in New Zealand from 1998 to 2002 (New Zealand Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2003) 
Mean age of major vehicle types in New Zealand (years) 
Year 
Cars Trucks Buses Motor Caravans Motorcycles Mopeds Trailers 
Average of all 
types (years) 
1998 11.2 11.7 12.9 18.2 13.9 13.5 15.9 13.9 
1999 11.28 12.01 12.87 18.08 14.37 13.74 16.04 14.1 
2000 11.42 12.25 13.03 18.44 14.83 13.94 16.28 14.3 
2001 11.55 12.47 13.18 18.21 15.25 13.98 16.51 14.5 




Table A – 7: Vehicle fires in parking buildings by day of week, 1995 – 2003 
All          
  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 TOTAL 
Monday 0 2 0 2 0 1 1 1 7 
Tuesday 0 3 3 6 5 0 0 1 18 
Wednesday 1 2 3 1 1 1 0 0 9 
Thursday 2 4 3 2 0 1 0 2 14 
Friday 5 3 4 2 5 1 2 2 24 
Saturday 6 2 2 2 0 1 0 1 14 
Sunday 2 2 3 1 2 0 2 3 15 
TOTAL 16 18 18 16 13 5 5 10 101 
          
Private Parking          
  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 TOTAL 
Monday 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 4 
Tuesday 0 3 2 2 4 0 0 0 11 
Wednesday 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 6 
Thursday 1 3 2 1 0 1 0 2 10 
Friday 3 0 4 2 3 1 1 2 16 
Saturday 3 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 7 
Sunday 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 7 
TOTAL 9 11 11 11 9 3 1 6 61 
          
Public Parking          
  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 TOTAL 
Monday 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
Tuesday 0 0 1 4 1 0 0 1 7 
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Wednesday 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Thursday 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 
Friday 2 3 0 0 2 0 1 0 8 
Saturday 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 7 
Sunday 1 1 2 0 1 0 2 1 8 
TOTAL 7 7 7 5 4 2 4 4 40 
 



































































































































































































Private 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 1 2 1 6 4 4 4 0 1 5 4 3 4 2 61 
Public 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 3 3 3 2 4 1 3 3 2 1 1 40 





Table A – 9: Heat sources involved in vehicles fires in parking buildings, 1995 – 2003 
  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 TOTAL 
Short circuit arc 7 4 11 3 1 2 3 2 33 
Match, lighter & cigarettes 3 2 2 4 4 1 0 5 21 
Exposure fire 2 3 2 3 7 1 0 0 18 
Hot object 2 6 3 4 0 0 1 1 17 
Flame 0 3 0 1 1 1 0 1 7 
Not Recorded 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 5 
TOTAL 16 18 18 16 13 5 5 10 101 
           
Short circuit arc          
Short circuit arc: Unspecified 4 1 6 2 1 1 2 2 19 
Short circuit arc: Mechanical damage 3 2 3 1 0 1 1 0 11 
Short circuit arc: Defective or worn installation 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Short circuit arc: Water cause 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Match, lighter & cigarettes          
Match 3 2 2 3 3 0 0 1 14 
Lighter: Flame type 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 3 
Lighter, match, candle - Possible combination of 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Cigarette 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Exposure fire          
Exposure Fire - unable to classify 1 3 2 3 3 1 0 0 13 
Exposure fire: Radiated heat 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 4 
Exposure fire: Conducted heat 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Hot object          
Heat from liquid fuelled equipment 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 
Heat from electrical equipment: Improperly operating 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 
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  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 TOTAL 
Heat from smoking material 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 
Friction heat, Overheated tyres 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Hot object - not classified above 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Heat from electrical equipment: Properly operating 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Flame          
Flame escaping from liquid fuelled equipment, Backfire 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 
Coal or coke fuelled equipment: Spark, Ember, Flame, Chimney spark 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Gas or liquid powered cutting torch: Spark, Ember, Flame 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Flame from gas equipment other than a torch 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 




Table A – 10: Object first ignited in vehicles fires in parking buildings, 1995 – 2003 
  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 TOTAL 
Unknown 3 6 4 5 7 1 1 0 27 
Electrical components 5 1 10 3 1 2 2 2 26 
Flammable liquid and gases (not aerosols or propellants) 3 4 1 1 2 0 1 3 15 
Others 2 3 2 4 1 0 0 2 14 
Upholstery and soft goods 1 2 0 1 2 1 1 3 11 
Structure components 2 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 8 
TOTAL 16 18 18 16 13 5 5 10 101 
           
Unknown          
Unknown 2 6 4 5 7 1 0 0 25 
Not Recorded 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Electrical components          
Electrical wire, Wiring insulation 5 1 10 3 1 2 0 1 23 
Power transfer and electrical equipment - not classified above 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Electronic componentry 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Others          
Multiple items 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 5 
Rubbish, Garbage, Waste 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Luggage: Suitcase, Travel bag, Backpack 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Newspaper, Magazine, Files 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Paper, excluding newspaper or rolled paper 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Tarpaulin, Tent, Marquee 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Pyrotechnics, Explosives, Fireworks 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Propellant, Aerosol, Hairspray 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Tyre 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Upholstery and soft goods          
Upholstered: Chairs, Sofas, Beds, Vehicle seats 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 5 
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  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 TOTAL 
Clothing (Not being worn) 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Non made up goods including fabrics and yarn 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Un-upholstered: Chairs, Sofas, Beds, Vehicle seats 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Bedding: Blankets, Sheets, Duvet 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Structure components          
Thermal Insulation: Batts, Loose fill (within walls or ceiling) 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
Floor coverings: Carpets, Mats, Rugs 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Framing, Structural member, Interior walls and doors 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Lagging: Conduit covering, Other insulating material 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 





Table A – 11: Material first ignited in vehicles fires in parking buildings from 1995 to 2003 
  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 TOTAL 
Unknown 3 6 4 6 6 1 2 0 28 
PVC: Floor tiles, Guttering, Pipes, Plastic bags, Electrical 
insulation 8 2 9 3 1 2 1 1 27 
Upholstery and soft goods 2 3 1 2 2 1 1 4 16 
Flammable liquid 2 4 1 2 2 0 1 3 15 
Others 1 3 3 3 2 1 0 2 15 
TOTAL 16 18 18 16 13 5 5 10 101 
           
Unknown          
Unknown 2 6 4 6 6 1 0 0 25 
Not Recorded 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 
Upholstery and soft goods          
Vinyl: Plastic coated fabrics, Upholstery fabrics (not floor 
covering) 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 4 
Fabric, Fibre (finished) 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 4 
Polyurethane: Furnishings, Upholstery, Mattresses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 
Cotton, Canvas, Rayon (not oiled canvas) 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
Wool, Wool mixtures (finished goods) 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Flammable liquid          
Petrol 1 3 1 2 2 0 1 2 12 
Flammable liquid: Kerosene, Methylated spirit, Ethanol, 
Turpentine 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Combustible liquid: Linseed, Lubricant, Cooking oil 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Others          
Multiple materials first ignited 0 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 5 
Rubbish (material having no value in the same container or pile) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 
Rubber 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
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  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 TOTAL 
Wood: sawn, finished timber 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Plywood 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Treated paper: building paper, wax or tar paper, wall paper 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Waterproof canvas 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 









Appendix B Data for Event Tree Analysis 
 
Table B – 1: Number of vehicles registered in New Zealand from 1996 to 2002 (New Zealand 
Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2003) 










Table B – 2: Survey results – Number of parking buildings in New Zealand 
Area District Council Private Parking Operator 
 Public Public 
Auckland 5 37 
Christchurch 7 2 
Dunedin - 2 
Hamilton - 1 
Queenstown - 1 
Rotorua 1 0 
Tauranga - 2 
Timaru 1 1 
Waitaki 0 0 










Appendix C Data and Results for Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (CBA) 
 
Table C – 1: The trend of American Producer Price Index for industrial commodity from 1972 to 









1972 37.8 1980 88 1988 106.3 1996 127.3 
1973 40.3 1981 97.4 1989 111.6 1997 127.7 
1974 49.2 1982 100 1990 115.8 1998 124.8 
1975 54.9 1983 101.1 1991 116.5 1999 126.5 
1976 58.4 1984 103.3 1992 117.4 2000 134.8 
1977 62.5 1985 103.7 1993 119 2001 135.7 
1978 67 1986 100 1994 120.7 2002 132.4 
1979 75.7 1987 102.6 1995 125.5 2003 139.1(P) 
 
(P) – Preliminary 
 
Table C – 2: Two fit results of vehicle fire damages in parking building fires from the 1972 US 
study 





Table C – 3: CBA results for sprinkler extension available: Scenario 1 (Private) and Scenario 2 
(Public) 
Annual Usage Ratio (R) Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
0 0.0 0.0 
500 0.1 0.1 
1000 0.3 0.2 
1500 0.4 0.3 
2000 0.6 0.4 
2500 0.7 0.5 
3000 0.9 0.6 
3500 1.0 0.7 
4000 1.2 0.8 
4500 1.3 0.9 
5000 1.5 1.0 
5500 1.6 1.0 





Table C – 4: CBA results for sprinkler extension not available & private – Scenario 3 




0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 
0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
500 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
1000 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 
1500 -0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
2000 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
2500 -0.4 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 
3000 -0.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 
3500 -0.4 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 
4000 -0.4 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 
4500 -0.4 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 
5000 -0.4 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 
5500 -0.4 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 
6000 -0.4 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 




10000 20000 30000 40000 50000      
0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0      
500 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1      
1000 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3      
1500 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4      
2000 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5      
2500 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7      
3000 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8      
3500 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0      
4000 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1      
4500 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3      
5000 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4      
5500 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6      





Table C – 5: CBA results for sprinkler extension not available & public – Scenario 4 




0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 
0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
500 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1000 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
1500 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
2000 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
2500 -0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
3000 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
3500 -0.4 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
4000 -0.4 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 
4500 -0.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 
5000 -0.4 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
5500 -0.4 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 
6000 -0.4 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 




10000 20000 30000 40000 50000      
0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0      
500 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1      
1000 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2      
1500 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2      
2000 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3      
2500 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4      
3000 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5      
3500 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6      
4000 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7      
4500 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8      
5000 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9      
5500 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0      





Table C – 6: CBA results for closed parking buildings: Sprinkler extension available – Scenario 1 
(Private) and Scenario 2 (Public) 
Annual Usage Ratio (R) Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
0 0.0 0.0 
500 0.4 0.3 
1000 0.8 0.6 
1500 1.2 0.9 
2000 1.6 1.1 
2500 2.1 1.4 
3000 2.5 1.7 
3500 2.9 2.0 
4000 3.3 2.3 
4500 3.7 2.6 
5000 4.1 2.9 
5500 4.6 3.2 






Table C – 7: CBA results for closed parking buildings: sprinkler extension not available & 
private – Scenario 3 




0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 
0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
500 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
1000 -0.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
1500 -0.4 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 
2000 -0.4 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 
2500 -0.4 0.5 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 
3000 -0.4 0.7 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 
3500 -0.4 0.9 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 
4000 -0.4 1.0 1.6 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 
4500 -0.4 1.2 1.9 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 
5000 -0.4 1.3 2.1 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4 
5500 -0.4 1.5 2.3 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 
6000 -0.4 1.6 2.5 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1 




10000 20000 30000 40000 50000      
0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0      
500 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4      
1000 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8      
1500 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2      
2000 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6      
2500 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0      
3000 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4      
3500 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8      
4000 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.2      
4500 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.6      
5000 3.5 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0      
5500 3.8 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.4      






Table C – 8: CBA results for closed parking buildings: sprinkler extension not available & public 
– Scenario 4  




0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 
0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
500 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
1000 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
1500 -0.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 
2000 -0.4 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 
2500 -0.4 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 
3000 -0.4 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 
3500 -0.4 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 
4000 -0.4 0.6 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 
4500 -0.4 0.7 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 
5000 -0.4 0.9 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 
5500 -0.4 1.0 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.6 
6000 -0.4 1.1 1.7 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 




10000 20000 30000 40000 50000      
0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0      
500 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2      
1000 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5      
1500 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8      
2000 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1      
2500 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4      
3000 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7      
3500 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9      
4000 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2      
4500 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5      
5000 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8      
5500 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1      




Table C – 9: Probability distribution for each input in @RISK for both scenarios 
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Sprinkler marginal maintenance – Mm Sprinkler marginal initial – Im 
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Discount rate – i Annual usage ratio – R 
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Table C – 10: The output results from @RISK for sprinkler extension available (Scenario 2) 
  
  
Probability Distribution Cumulative Probability Distribution 
  
Summary Statistics of Cost-Benefit Ratio  
Statistic Value Percentile Value 
Minimum -0.04 5% -0.019 
Maximum 1.59 10% -0.015 
Mean 0.049 15% -0.012 
Std Dev 0.10 20% -0.009 
Variance 0.0099 25% -0.006 
Skewness 4.0883 30% -0.002 
Kurtosis 30.0890 35% 0.002 
Median 0.02 40% 0.007 
Mode -0.01 45% 0.011 
Left X -0.02 50% 0.017 
Left P 5% 55% 0.024 
Right X 0.22 60% 0.031 
Right P 95% 65% 0.040 
Diff X 0.24 70% 0.050 
Diff P 90% 75% 0.063 
#Errors - 80% 0.081 
Filter Min - 85% 0.105 
Filter Max - 90% 0.142 
#Filtered - 95% 0.224 
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Table C – 11: The output results from @RISK for sprinkler extension not available (Scenario 4) 
  
  
Probability Distribution Cumulative Probability Distribution 
  
Summary Statistics of Cost-Benefit Ratio  
Statistic Value Percentile Value 
Minimum -0.08 5% -0.04 
Maximum 3.07 10% -0.04 
Mean 0.026 15% -0.03 
Std Dev 0.10 20% -0.03 
Variance 0.0096 25% -0.02 
Skewness 5.3895 30% -0.02 
Kurtosis 65.3303 35% -0.02 
Median 0.00 40% -0.01 
Mode -0.05 45% -0.01 
Left X -0.04 50% 0.00 
Left P 5% 55% 0.00 
Right X 0.19 60% 0.01 
Right P 95% 65% 0.02 
Diff X 0.23 70% 0.03 
Diff P 90% 75% 0.04 
#Errors - 80% 0.06 
Filter Min - 85% 0.08 
Filter Max - 90% 0.12 
#Filtered - 95% 0.19 
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Table C – 12: Sensitivity analysis – sprinkler extension available (Scenario 2) 
Rank Name Regression Coefficient 
#1 Annual usage ratio – R 0.694 
#2 Unit fire damage – D 0.489 
#3 Discount rate – i -0.092 
#4 Non-sprinklered – ∑ f × n 0.084 
#5 Marginal initial– Im -0.034 
#6 Marginal maintenance – Mm -0.018 
#7 Reduction percentage – p -0.016 
#8 Sprinklered – fs -0.014 
 
Table C – 13: Sensitivity analysis – sprinkler extension not available (Scenario 4) 
Rank Name Regression Coefficient 
#1 Annual usage ratio – R 0.681 
#2 Unit fire damage – D 0.481 
#3 Non-sprinklered – ∑ f × n 0.083 
#4 Discount rate – i -0.056 
#5 Fixed maintenance – MF -0.025 
#6 Marginal maintenance – Mm -0.018 
#7 Marginal initial – Im -0.017 
#8 Sprinklered – fs -0.012 
#9 Reduction percentage – p -0.011 
#10 Fixed initial – IF 0.000 
 
 
